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INSIDE THE BLACK BOX OF PROSECUTOR DISCRETION 
 
Megan S. Wright*, Shima Baradaran Baughman** & Christopher Robertson*** 
 
In their charging and bargaining decisions, prosecutors have unparalleled 
and nearly-unchecked discretion that leads to incarceration or freedom for 
millions of Americans each year. More than courts, legislators, or any other 
justice system player, in the aggregate prosecutors’ choices are the key drivers 
of outcomes, whether the rates of mass incarceration or the degree of racial 
disparities in justice. To date, there is precious little empirical research on how 
prosecutors exercise their breathtaking discretion. We do not know whether they 
consistently charge like cases alike or whether crime is in the eye of the 
beholder. We do not know what sorts of limits, supervision, or guidelines 
prosecutors work within. And we do not know what sorts of information 
prosecutors rely upon, when making their decisions. Prosecutors’ decisions 
have accordingly been called a “black box” for their inscrutability.   
Until now. We recruited over 500 prosecutors nationwide, and had them 
charge an identical case given identical substantive law, specify the plea 
bargain terms that they would seek, and explain their decisions. We also learned 
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about their internal office guidelines and procedures, and the information they 
rely upon when making charging and bargaining decisions.  
Our study tells a story of surprising severity in how prosecutors dispose of 
a relatively mild case with no harm to victims, creating potentially devastating 
consequences for an offender suffering from apparent mental illness. Taking 
advantage of our vignette-survey design, which presents the exact same case to 
hundreds of prosecutors, we also document wild heterogeneity in prosecutor 
charging practices, with some dismissing the case out of hand and others 
demanding months or years of incarceration. We also find that many 
prosecutors lack meaningful guidelines or supervision. Nonetheless, in our 
review of their qualitative explanations, we also find prosecutors aspiring to do 
justice, concerned about harm to victims and the rehabilitation of offenders, and 
considering their mental health and financial wherewithal. From these findings, 
we shed light in an otherwise theoretically rich but empirically lacking area of 
criminal scholarship.    
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Prosecutors have extensive power and what guides their decisions is largely unknown 
and inscrutable.1 There is an ongoing national conversation about the role of prosecutors 
in increasing and potentially reducing national incarceration rates,2 as well as their role in 
contributing to incarceration disparities that harm people of color.3 Some scholars have 
focused on the rise of newly-elected prosecutors articulating progressive visions,4 
intimating that progressive scholarship has swept a wave over the nation.5 However, it is 
unclear whether isolated progressive statements from head prosecutors translate into 
meaningful leniency from line prosecutors. Indeed, prosecutor decision making, including 
what factors they consider in charging and plea bargaining, has been referred to as the 
“black box.”6 This is protected information that is not discoverable by defendants and has 
                                               
1 Chad Flanders & Stephen Galoob, Progressive Prosecution in a Pandemic, 110 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 685, 690 (2020) (“[T]he power and discretion of prosecutors . . . could be wielded 
either for harsh justice or for mercy and leniency.”); Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutors and Their State 
and Local Polities, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 823, 825 (2020) (“[A] prosecutor’s declination 
policy is a matter of debate with the prosecutor’s office, among other lawyers, and with the larger 
voting public.”). 
2 Jeffrey Bellin, Expanding the Reach of Progressive Prosecution, 110 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 707 (2020) (describing how societal pressures have lead to the rise of progressive 
prosecutors to address the failings of mass incarceration and recidivism). 
3 Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, When Prosecutors Politick: Progressive Law Enforcers 
Then and Now, 110 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 719, 752 (2020) (noting that progressive 
prosecutors “attempt to minimize racial and economic injustice, exemplified by high rates of 
incarceration, particularly of poor people and minorities.”). 
4 See, e.g., Bellin, supra note 2 at 707–11; Flanders & Galoob, supra note 1 at 688–94; see 
also Rachel E. Barkow, Can Prosecutors Help To End Mass Incarceration?, __ MICH. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 9) (highlighting that progressive prosecutors face challenges to 
getting elected, even in urban, liberal areas). 
5 Kim Foxx was elected State’s Attorney for Cook County, Illinois (Chicago) in 2016; Larry 
Krasner was elected District Attorney of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 2017; Rachael Rollins was 
elected District Attorney of Suffolk County, Massachusetts (Boston) in 2018. See Caren Morrison, 
Progressive Prosecutor’s Scored Big Wins in 2020 Elections, Boosting a Nationwide Trend, THE 
CONVERSATION, https://theconversation.com/progressive-prosecutors-scored-big-wins-in-2020-
elections-boosting-a-nationwide-trend-149322; see also Cara Bayles, A New Class of Prosecutors: 
Reformers Win Races Nationwide, LAW 360 (Nov. 8, 2020, 8:02 PM EST), 
https://www.law360.com/access-to-justice/articles/1326594/a-new-class-of-prosecutors-reformers-
win-races-nationwide (“Progressive newcomers were elected to top prosecutor posts in Los 
Angeles; Austin, Texas; Orlando, Florida; Detroit; Aurora, Colorado; and Columbus, Ohio; as well 
as what were considered local presidential battlegrounds, like Michigan’s Oakland County, a suburb 
of Detroit.”). 
6 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 129 (2008) (“[T]he 
black box: the inner workings of prosecutors’ offices. . . . [T]he absence of controlling statutes or 
case law makes it possible for prosecutors to do their daily work without explaining their choices to 
the public.”).  
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been difficult to examine empirically.7  
Prosecutors play a key role in the administration of criminal justice.8 Prosecutors 
decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings,9 what charges to bring,10 what penalties to 
seek,11 and whether to agree to a plea bargain,12 and what sentencing recommendations to 
advise.13 The prosecutor may be the government official with the most unreviewable power 
and discretion.14 Since the vast majority of cases are resolved short of trial, a second key 
                                               
7 Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Prosecutors and Mass Incarceration, __S. 
CALIF. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 27–36) (noting the lack of up-to-date empirical 
research on prosecutorial decisions). 
8 See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 717, 
773 (1996); George C. Thomas, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Mundane, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2005); Brandon K. Crase, When Doing Justice Isn’t 
Enough: Reinventing the Guidelines for Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 475, 
475 (2007); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARVARD L. REV. 1521, 
1521 (1981). 
9 See generally Sarah Ribstein, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on White-Collar 
Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 868 (2009); Samuel J. Levine, The Potential Utility of 
Disciplinary Regulation as a Remedy for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 4 (2017); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable 
Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1700 (2010). 
10 See generally Wesley MacNeil Oliver & Rishi Batra, Standards of Legitimacy in Criminal 
Negotiations, 20 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61, 67 (2015); Craig H. Solomon, Prosecutorial 
Vindictiveness: Divergent Lower Court Applications of the Due Process Prohibition, 50 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 324, 324 (1982); Kyle Graham, Overcharging, 11 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 701, 710 
(2014); Russell M. Gold, Promoting Democracy in Prosecution, 86 WASH. L. REV. 69, 84 (2011). 
11 See generally Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has No Clothes III: Personnel Policies 
and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 53 (2012); 
Peter L. Markowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 489, 490 (2017). 
12 See generally Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: 
The Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 599 (2014); Jeffrey Standen, Plea 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1471, 1472 (1993); Ronald Wright 
& Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 33 (2002); Michael M. 
O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GEO. L. REV. 407, 420–25 (2008). 
13 See generally Nicole T. Amsler, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying Federal Corporate 
Charging Considerations to Individuals, 66 DUKE L.J. 169, 173 (2016); Shima Baradaran 
Baughman, Subconstitutional Checks, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1071, 1091 (2017); Kate Stith, The 
Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 
1470 (2008); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 107 (1994); O’Hear, supra note 12; Geoffrey 
S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising Prosecutors: Applying the 
Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY 
J. CRIM. L. 395, 399 (2009); Vorenberg, supra note 9; Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions 
as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1011 (2005). 
14 Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 959, 959 (2009); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering the 
Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act. 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 35 (1994). 
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point of attention is plea bargaining, which is also controlled by prosecutors.  
Prosecutors’ wide discretion creates opportunity for racial and gender bias,15 
overcharging,16 vindictiveness,17 plea bargaining abuses,18 and wrongful convictions.19 
However, prosecutorial discretion allows prosecutors to adapt to different scenarios 
involving unique facts and defendants and provides a way for prosecutors to manage their 
ever-growing caseloads through plea-bargaining.20 Arguably, prosecutorial discretion puts 
decision making in the hands of those with institutional knowledge of the criminal justice 
system. As the Supreme Court has explained, “because discretion is essential to the 
criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would infer 
that the discretion has been abused.”21 
                                               
15 Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive 
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1590 (2006); see State v. Monday, 257 P.3d 551, 556 
(Wash. 2011) (“Prosecutor Konat injected racial prejudice into the trial proceedings by asserting 
that black witnesses are unreliable.”); see also United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 774 (1st Cir. 
1995) (“[C]ourts must not tolerate prosecutors’ efforts gratuitously to inject issues like race and 
ethnicity into criminal trials.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Judging Jena’s D.A.: The Prosecutor and Racial 
Esteem, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393, 420 (2009) (arguing that “racially-skewed outcomes . . . 
cannot occur without prosecutorial support”); The Mo. Task Force on Gend. & Justice, Report of 
the Missouri Task Force on Gender and Justice, 58 MO. L. REV. 485, 506 (1993) (explaining that 
prosecutors may assign low priority to domestic violence cases because they lack understanding, 
sensitivity, and may not believe female victims). 
16 Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 140 
(1968); see also Wright & Miller, supra note 12 at 32 (arguing for a hard screening system to prevent 
prosecutorial overcharging); H. Mitchell Caldwell, Coercive Plea Bargaining: The Unrecognized 
Scourge of the Justice System, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 63, 72 (2011) (applying game theory to 
overcharging). 
17 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 
(1982). 
18 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 40 (1970) (threat of death penalty to force 
defendant to plead guilty to lesser murder charge not coercive); United States v. Speed Joyeros, 204 
F. Supp. 2d 412, 444 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (extended pre-trial incarceration caused defendant’s physical 
and mental health to deteriorate, but plea bargain acceptable despite the danger of due process 
violations by the intensive pressure on defendant to plead guilty). 
19 See generally Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and 
Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for A Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 403 (2006) 
(discussing one study showing that, out of 62 persons exonerated by DNA evidence, prosecutorial 
misconduct played a role in 26 of those wrongful convictions); see also Baughman, supra note 13 
at 1110–11; Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 291 (2006). 
20 George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 865 (2000) (arguing that a 
crushing workload and increased caseloads explain why prosecutors began to choose to plea bargain 
and why they continue to do so today). 
21 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 280 (1987). 
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Nonetheless, many legal scholars argue that the unchecked power of prosecutorial 
discretion is too broad.22 Legal commentators have characterized prosecutorial discretion 
as a “dangerous”23 and “tyrannical”24 decision-making process because it is “unreviewed 
and its justifications are unarticulated.”25 Others have claimed that prosecutorial discretion 
is the single largest cause of mass incarceration and is responsible for the expansive growth 
in felony convictions since the 1970s.26  
One troubling aspect of unbridled prosecutorial discretion is that it renders 
inconsistent results with defendants receiving widely varying treatment for similar 
                                               
22 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from 
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (“There are currently no effective legal 
checks in place. . . . In a government whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of powers, 
federal prosecutors are a glaring and dangerous exception.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of 
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1049 (2006) (similar); Stephen B. Bright & 
Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 
2150, 2150 (2013) (“The U.S. criminal system is not truly adversarial because prosecutors possess 
broad, unchecked power and therefore determine results in criminal cases with little or no input 
from the defense.”); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III, In Defense of American Criminal Justice, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 1099, 1130 (2014) (“[U]unfettered prosecutorial discretion and the ‘relative absence 
of efforts to standardize and regulate charging practices’ lead to arbitrary charging decisions, often 
with an outsized impact on minorities and the poor.”); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 295 (2011) (“[P]rosecutorial power is unchecked by law and, given 
its invisibility, barely checked by politics.”). 
23 Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940); see 
also Bennett L Gerhman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 408–09 (1992) 
(“Uncontrolled discretion . . . has the potential for abuse. In the hands of prosecutors, this potential 
is now a reality.”). 
24 Henderson v. United States, 349 F.2d 712, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); 
see also Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 399 (2001) (noting that “[t]he current constitutional design is 
dysfunctional as a check on prosecutorial power.”). 
25 Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1073 (1972); Leonetti, supra note 11 at 55 
(“[U]nreviewed prosecutorial discretion makes a nasty cocktail when mixed with invidious forms 
of prosecutorial conduct.”). 
26  Barkow, supra note 4 (manuscript at 24) (“Mass incarceration is driven by two factors: the 
number of cases coming into the system (admissions) and the length of sentences. Prosecutors have 
discretion to change the rate of admissions and for cases going forward, they can also influence 
sentences based on the charges they bring and the sentences they request (or accept in pleas).”); 
John F. Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 1239, 1240 
(2012) (concluding that prosecutors are the “who” behind prison growth in the United States due to 
number of felony filings per arrest); JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS 
INCARCERATION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (“Recall that over the 1990s and 
2000s . . . even as the number of arrests declined the number of felony cases filed in state courts 
rose sharply. In the end, the probability that a prosecutor would file felony charges against and 
arrestee basically doubled, and that change pushed prison populations up even as crime dropped.”). 
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crimes.27 As a result, the public is unsure if the prosecutor has a reasonable explanation for 
the apparent inconsistent decision or if she is abusing her power or demonstrating bias.28 
Questions about the consistency and fairness of prosecutorial decisions motivates this 
study. 
There is currently no field experimental evidence comparing how prosecutors 
nationally charge a case with similar facts. While this evidence does not yet exist, this 
Article provides the next best thing: insight into how prosecutors wish they could charge a 
case. It also provides insight into what limits a prosecutor in charging, what guidelines they 
are required to follow, and what prosecutors claim they consider when charging a case.  
This Article explores prosecutors’ discretion, specifically their discretion in the initial 
charging decision. The first point of contact with a prosecutor is the decision to charge a 
defendant with a crime. Prosecutor discretion in the charging decision is important to study 
because it may reduce the efficacy of downstream policy reforms, such as sentencing 
guidelines, which have been enacted to reduce disparities in outcomes.29 
In this Article, we present results from an original empirical study of prosecutor 
decision making in order to better understand the “black box” of prosecutor discretion. We 
surveyed hundreds of prosecutors about how they make charging decisions, and we also 
presented them with a hypothetical case and asked for their charging and punishment 
recommendations. Our results demonstrate significant variability in prosecutor decision 
making, especially by geographic region, perhaps because many of our respondents work 
in offices that do not have internal guidelines or standards that constrain discretion. Our 
results also illuminate the process of prosecutor decision making, including factors they 
claim are important to their decision. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews prior research on prosecutor decision 
making, including variability in charging, severity in charging, national and local guidance, 
and the factors that prosecutors rely upon in making decisions. Part II describes our 
empirical approach, including the methods for recruiting prosecutors, collecting data, and 
analyzing the data. Part III lays out our findings, including the heterogeneity in charges 
and penalties assessed, the prosecutors’ reasons for their decisions, the use of guidelines or 
standards, and the information they rely upon. Part IV provides a discussion, identifying 
directions for reform and for further research.  
 
                                               
27 Bibas, supra note 14, at 978; Vorenberg, supra note 9 at 1537; Anne Bowen Poulin, 
Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making the Prosecution Get Its Story 
Straight, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1423 (2001). 
28 Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 911, 945–46 (2006). 
29 Rachel E. Barkow, Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 1599, 1602 (2012) (“[Sentencing] commissions could and should do more to address 
the relationship between guidelines and prosecutorial power . . . . [b]ecause some amount of 
prosecutorial discretion is necessary and inevitable.”); see also Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second 
Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 217, 221 (2005); Russell D. Covey, Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law, 
104 CAL. L. REV. 447, 483 (2016). 
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I.  REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH ON PROSECUTOR DECISIONMAKING 
 
While fairness and justice critiques of prosecutors are plentiful,30 there has not been a 
focus in the scholarship on the variability of prosecutor charging or concerns about severity 
of charging by prosecutors. One of the reasons for this is because we lack national data on 
how prosecutors’ charging varies across the country. While individual prosecutors have 
been critiqued for severity,31 there has not been national evidence to study whether 
prosecutors as a group are charging appropriately. This Part reviews the literature on 
variability and severity in prosecutor charging decisions and sentencing recommendations. 
It then explains the constraints on prosecutor discretion, namely the role of professional or 
office level guidelines. And finally, it reviews the literature discussing the factors relevant 
to prosecutors’ decisions. 
 
A.  Variability in Prosecutor Charging 
 
There are few explicit bars to prosecutor variability in charging, including from the 
Constitution, statutes or national prosecutor bodies. Some scholars have even argued that 
consistency across prosecutorial decisions should not be the goal; rather, we should strive 
towards a system where there are “roughly equivalent probabilities of receiving some 
favorable result.”32 As compared to criminal justice systems in Europe, uniformity is a less 
articulated priority in the U.S. criminal justice system.33 However there are some 
articulated standards warning against variability in prosecutor charging. The Constitution 
limits variability on prosecutor charging only where concerns of race, religion or another 
arbitrary classification are raised.34 The American Bar Association (ABA) cautions against 
“unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly situated persons,” but does so by listing it as 
only one of many factors to be considered in any case.35 Likewise, the commentary to the 
                                               
30 See Bibas supra note 14 (“The deeper problem is that systemic patterns of charging and plea 
bargaining, influenced by self-interest, bias, and other considerations, may undercut equality and 
equity.”); Vorenberg supra note 9 (“[P]rosecutors' actions can determine who gets twenty years and 
who gets a year or two or probation for essentially the same conduct.”); Leonetti, supra note 11 
(“[U]nreviewed prosecutorial discretion makes a nasty cocktail when mixed with invidious forms 
of prosecutorial conduct.”). 
31 See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Prosecutors Draw Fire for Sentences Called Harsh, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 5, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/us/federal-prosecutors-assailed-in-outcry-
over-sentencing.html (offering defendant either life without parole for “trafficking one kilogram of 
heroin” or “sentence of 10 years” with guilty plea). 
32 Bowers, supra note 9 at 1677. 
33 William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits 
of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1325, 1346 
(1993) (citing the variability in jury decisions as one example). 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Oyler v. Boyles, 363 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (noting that prosecutor 
charging variability presents a problem where deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such 
as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification). 
35 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION (4th ed. 2017), § 3-
4.4(a)(ix). 
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National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) standards highlight the importance of 
“uniformity,” stating that “the goal of uniformity protects a victim or accused from 
receiving substantially different treatment because the case was assigned to one individual 
in the office and not to another.”36 In addition, when considering charges, the NDAA 
standards list “charging decisions made for similarly-situated defendants” as one factor 
that “may be considered.”37 
Robust studies of prosecutor variability in charging do not exist, although one survey 
of 43 Wisconsin district attorneys showed significant variability in charging decisions.38 
Variability in charging decisions is difficult to study in part because “courts have limited 
authority to review [charging and plea bargaining] decisions and identify and remedy 
abuses.”39 Experts have recognized that “[i]n practice . . . the exercise of discretion varies 
considerably among offices.”40  
Office structure may play a role in charging variability, and overall the more 
centralized charging practices, the less variability between prosecutors. For example, Ron 
Wright and Marc Miller examined the actions taken in New Orleans to “ensure reasonable 
uniformity in screening decisions.”41 In another study Ron Wright and Kay Levine 
conducted interviews with 42 misdemeanor and drug prosecutors in the Southeast, finding 
one recurring theme: “the need for consistency among different prosecutors who work in 
                                               
36 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 1-5.4 and 
commentary (2009). 
37 Id. at 4-1.3(i). 
38 Kim Banks Mayer, Comment, Applying Open Records Policy to Wisconsin District 
Attorneys: Can Charging Guidelines Promote Public Awareness? 1996 WIS. L. REV. 295, 299 
(1996). 
39 Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 51 (2016) 58–59 (citing United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1299–1300 (9th 
Cir. 1991)). 
40 Catherine M. Coles, Community Prosecution, Problem Solving, and Public Accountability: 
The Evolving Strategy of the American Prosecutor, HARV. KENNEDY SCH. 11 (Oct. 2000), 
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/community_prosecution.pdf. 
41 Wright & Miller, supra note 12 at 62–66. Wright and Miller discuss a number of structural 
changes aimed at achieving more uniformity including assigning the role of screening to senior trial 
attorneys (id. at 62), tracking data on the reasons for each decision in the process to try ensure 
consistency even with the high staff turnover (id. at 62, 66), assigning some types of cases “to 
screeners with special expertise” (ex: grouping by drug cases, ordinary cases, homicides, rapes, 
etc.), having the screener interview key witnesses and victims (and sometimes the officer as well). 
Id. at 63. There were also some procedural changes made through office policies: to “charge the 
most serious crime the facts will support at trial” (id.), requiring that “the charges chosen for the 
information will stay in place through trial” to address overcharging, supervisory review of all 
refusals to charge, policy discouraging refusal to charge specific types of crime (like domestic 
violence cases), “[a] supervisor must approve any decision to drop or change charges after the 
information is filed” and creating “a ‘stigma’ . . . in reducing charges.” Id. at 64. The office also 
declines to prosecute a large number of cases to encourage “police officers to investigate more 
thoroughly.” Id. at 65. 
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the same office.”42 Wright and Levine theorized that there was a “correlation between 
social architecture and consistency”: the more hierarchical the office, the greater emphasis 
on consistency.43 Stephanos Bibas has also asserted that “hierarchy and centralization 
improve consistent, accountable application of rules.”44 Specifically, creating “centralized 
charging units” has been theorized to decrease variability by reducing the temptation to 
“overcharge[] weak cases so that they can later charge-bargain them away.”45 Others have 
theorized that variability may be a result of a lack of office-wide policies or reliance on 
“unit-specific policy making.”46 When chief prosecutors “rel[y] on unit managers to 
translate their philosophy into policies,” managers may vary in their approaches, “creating 
opportunities for inconsistencies across units and over time.”47 Overall the lack of office 
policies in charging or a centralized charging unit has been theorized to cause variability 
in prosecutor charging. 
Most of the controls on prosecutor charging are imposed informally due to social 
norms, although prosecutors maintain considerable discretion. According to Marc Miller 
and Ron Wright, outside of formal rules, social norms “can create rules within a 
prosecutor’s office that constrain and regulate the discretion of individual prosecutors.”48 
These norms are in no way articulated in any organized manner.49 Some experts have 
recommended that prosecutors should have some informal controls that ensure consistency 
in charging and plea bargaining within an office.50 Though without written standards, “it is 
only natural that there will be a lack of uniformity in filing decisions and a breakdown in 
                                               
42 Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1119, 1171 (2013). 
43 Id. 
44 Stephanos Bibas, supra note 14, at 1005 (citing Dan Richman, Institutional Coordination 
and Sentencing Reform, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2062–73 (2006)). In the plea-bargaining context, 
offices with less hierarchical structures had greater variability between prosecutors’ decisions within 
the office than in offices that placed greater emphasis on “professionalism” and enforcement of clear 
policies. JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 
OF CRIMINAL COURTS 85–86, 116–17, 146–54 (1977) (comparing plea bargaining discretion and 
organizational structures in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit). 
45 Stephanos Bibas, supra note 14, at 1001 (2009); Wright & Miller, supra note 12 at 61–82 
(finding that plea bargaining in New Orleans was reduced when centralized screening processes 
were implemented). 
46 Don Stemen & Bruce Frederick, Rules, Resources, and Relationships: Contextual 
Constraints on Prosecutorial Decision Making, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 72 (2013). 
47 Id. 71–72 (2013) (“Allowing unit-specific policies and norms to develop may result in 
simple differences in attitudes about the appropriate sentence recommended in a plea offer or it may 
result in major, fundamental differences in the overall approach to evaluating cases.”). 
48 Miller & Wright, supra note 6 at 178; Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial 
Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837, 840 (2004) (“[P]rosecutors should make decisions based on 
articulable principles or subprinciples that command broad societal acceptance”). 
49 Green & Zacharias, supra note 48 (“[P]rosecutors have never, either individually or 
collectively, undertaken the task of identifying workable norms for the array of discretionary 
decisions that their offices make each day.”). 
50 Pizzi, supra note 33 at 1345. 
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the implementation of prosecutor’s decisions.”51 Josh Bowers has recognized that 
discretion will always seep into prosecutor enforcement of the law, despite the desire to 
reach consistency.52  But greater transparency may provide more motivation toward 
consistency in decision-making and “can help stakeholders to monitor prosecutors’ 
performance and to push for more concrete policies.”53 While uniformity in charging is not 
a requirement for prosecutors, some scholars have argued that greater transparency in 
prosecutor decisions or centralized decisionmaking may help reduce variability or 
improper prosecutor motives. 
 
B.  Severity in Charging Decisions 
 
There is little in way of national or local guidance on the severity of charges 
prosecutors bring for any particular set of alleged facts. ABA guidance on the severity of 
charges is limited to encouraging prosecutors to “act with integrity and balanced judgment 
to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of appropriate 
severity,” and by using their “discretion to not pursue criminal charges in appropriate 
circumstances.”54 NDAA guidance is similarly abstract, encouraging prosecutors to file 
charges that the prosecutor “believes adequately encompass the accused’s criminal 
activity” and that they “reasonably believe[] can be substantiated by admissible evidence 
at trial.”55 There is no national admonition to limit prosecutor charging when there is 
discretion to do so. Indeed, there are some obvious examples of explicit guidance or 
informal rules advocating for charging the most serious crimes available. For example, the 
U.S. Attorney Manual states that “a Federal prosecutor should initially charge the most 
serious, readily provable offense or offenses consistent with the defendant’s conduct.”56 
Some members of the Supreme Court in recent years indicated that a Justice Department 
policy of charging the most severe offense as a general rule raises serious concerns.57 But 
this federal policy has not been overturned. 
                                               
51 Norman Maleng, Charging and Sentencing: Where Prosecutors’ Guidelines Help Both 
Sides, 1 CRIM. JUST. 6, 41 (1987). 
52 Bowers, supra note 9 at 1676. 
53 Stephanos Bibas, supra note 14, at 1007. 
54 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-1.2(b). 
55 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 36 at 4-2.2. 
56 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUST. MANUAL § 9-27,300 (2020); see also Memorandum from Jeff 
Sessions, Office of the Att’y Gen., Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/965896/download (“[I]t is a core principle that 
prosecutors should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense.”); but see John 
Ashcroft, Memo Regarding Policy on Charging of Criminal Defendants, DEP’T OF JUST. (Sept. 22, 
2003), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm (“[C]harges should 
not be filed simply to exert leverage to induce a plea.”). 
57 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–30, Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (2015) (No. 
13-7451) (Justice Scalia stated, in response to such a rule, “I’m going to be very careful about how 
severe I make statutes . . . or how much coverage I give to severe statutes.”; Chief Justice Roberts 
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Research has suggested that junior prosecutors are more likely to bring the most 
severe charges, for a variety of reasons. One public defender argues that the decision by 
new prosecutors to pursue the maximum charges “comes from a fear of mistakes, of 
making the wrong judgment call about a stranger, of granting leniency when the recipient 
may disappoint by committing another crime[,] . . . of being made a fool by some sly 
defendant, or duped by some defense attorney, or being called soft on crime.”58 Wright and 
Levine have found in their studies of prosecutors that young prosecutors may consider 
themselves “superheroes, ready to try any case on the docket” while more seasoned 
prosecutors think of themselves as “arbitrators, negotiators, ‘BS meters,’ and advocates.”59 
Their research has found that prosecutors with less experience were more likely “to ignore 
the human dimension of many cases, approaching each file with a standardized view, 
focusing on the need to punish everyone.”60 As such, inexperience made prosecutors less 
likely to dismiss charges and more likely to closely follow the most obvious charges 
available in statutes.61 In addition, in interviews, “[e]ntry-level and junior prosecutors were 
more likely than their experienced colleagues to say that it is important to stick with the 
most serious charges during plea negotiations.”62 
 The plea-bargaining process may also play a role in the severity of initial charging 
decisions. Some evidence exists that prosecutors charge aggressively to allow for a lesser 
plea.63 For instance, in Alafair Burke’s study, one prosecutor stated that he would “charge 
aggressively to allow for a plea to a lesser offense.”64 The charging decision is closely tied 
to plea bargaining, which may begin even before formal charges are filed.65 Notably, 
NDAA’s National Prosecution Standards do not include any restriction on filing charges 
to obtain plea bargaining leverage.”66 
                                               
also stated that such a policy could give “extraordinary leverage . . . [to] Federal prosecutors” if the 
statute were to cover the alleged criminal behavior in that particular case). 
58 Fan Li, Youthful Indiscretion: The Structural Challenge of Inexperienced Prosecutors, in 
CAN THEY DO THAT? UNDERSTANDING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 115 (Melba V. Pearson ed., 
2020). 
59 Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’ Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 1065, 1126 (2014). 
60 Id. at 1084. 
61 Id. at 1084–85. 
62 Id. at 1087–88. 
63 See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91 
MARQ. L. REV. 183, 201–02 (2007) (describing how prosecutors can “anchor” on preliminary 
decisions and then “inadequately adjust” from that initial anchor); Alschuler, supra note 16, at 140 
(arguing that more severe charging decisions incentivized by plea bargaining); Robert E. Scott & 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1965 (1992) (arguing that 
broad criminal statutes give prosecutors “an unchecked opportunity to overcharge and generate easy 
pleas.”). 
64 Burke, supra note 66, at 202. 
65 Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1355. 
66 Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1225 (2020) (citing NAT’L 
DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard 4-2.3 (2009)). 
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The line between overcharging and proper severity is unclear. Charging the highest 
provable offense may be seen as overcharging by some while considered fair by others. 
Jeffrey Bellin is in the latter camp as he recently argued that overcharging should be 
defined as charging a defendant with an offense that is not “readily provable” or an offense 
for which the jury should not convict.”67 But on the other side, Green argues “that people 
who commit crimes should not necessarily be punished as harshly as the law permits.”68 
The recent scholarly focus on progressive prosecution has discouraged severe charging,69 
often focusing on declination as one way to limit severity.70 
Like with variability, there is no explicit guidance for prosecutors not to seek the most 
serious charge they can prove. Scholars and federal prosecutor guidebooks have supported 
this position, though the tide is turning towards advising prosecutors to decline to charge 
when possible to reduce the carceral state. Our study presents respondents with a 
hypothetical, relatively minor crime to explore both the variability and severity of 
punishment prosecutors recommend for the same crime. 
 
C.  National and Local Guidance for Prosecutors 
 
Notwithstanding their broad discretion, prosecutors are subject to rules of professional 
conduct in their jurisdiction, ABA and NDAA guidance, and possibly internal office 
guidelines on prosecutor charging. While these standards may technically apply, there is 
little accountability if prosecutors refuse to comply71 and little assurance that prosecutors 
are even aware of these guidelines. 
 
1.  Rules of Professional Conduct 
 
                                               
67 Id. 
68 Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 
123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 599, 612 (2019) (noting that inequitable results may occur when “one victim 
may wish to pursue charges and a harsh sentence and yet the other victim [in a similar case] may 
not want charges filed.”). 
69 Bellin, supra note 69, at 1248 (identifying “the progressive intuition that prosecutors should 
not charge a more severe offense to obtain plea bargaining leverage.”); see also Maura Ewing, 
America’s Leading Reform-Minded District Attorney Has Taken His Most Radical Step Yet, SLATE 
(Dec. 4, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/12/philadelphia-district-attorney-larry-
krasner-criminal-justice-reform.html (quoting Larry Krasner, “The era of trying to get away with 
the highest charge regardless of the facts is over.”). 
70 See, e.g., W. Kerrel Murray, Populist Prosecutorial Nullification, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2021) (discussing prosecutorial nullification as a populist response to severe criminal 
codes); Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor, MINN. L. J. __ (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 135) (arguing that “the anti-carceral prosecutor seeks to enact policies of 
declination.”). 
71 Corn & Gershowitz, supra note 13, at 396. 
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Prosecutors are governed by standards of professional conduct in their jurisdiction, 
and through the American Bar Association.72 However, as Bruce Green points out, the idea 
that prosecutors have “higher ethical obligations than other lawyers . . . is largely absent 
from the ethics rules.”73 While the comments to ABA Rule 3.8 state that prosecutors have 
“the responsibility of a minister of justice,”74 this charge is ill-defined.75 Some jurisdictions 
“have revised or supplemented [ABA] Rule 3.8(a) to further regulate prosecutors’ charging 
decisions.”76 But even if these guidelines have been supplemented, “[b]y and large . . . bar 
authorities have proven to be ineffectual” when it comes to accountability.77 Indeed, when 
prosecutors act inappropriately in violation of the rules of professional conduct, discipline 
is rare.78 The conventional wisdom in this area is that “disciplinary authorities do not 
effectively regulate prosecutors.”79 Sanctions—if they exist—are typically minimal,80 and 
                                               
72 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-1.2(c). The NDAA has 
challenged the legitimacy of ABA guidance. Brief for National District Attorneys Association as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, 5, Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012) (referring to the ABA 
as “a private organization that does not speak for prosecutors” and stating “that the ABA has become 
captive to the narrow adversarial interests of the criminal defense bar.”). 
73 Bruce A. Green & Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy 
for Abuses of Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 143, 149 (2016); see also R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can 
Teach Us About A Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to “Seek Justice”, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 635, 691 
(2006) (arguing that Model Rule 3.8’s emphasis on the “responsibility” of prosecutors to seek justice 
“is obscured” both by “minimum conduct rules within Rule 3.8” and “burying the ‘justice’ 
exhortation in a later comment to the Rule”). 
74 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. [1] (AM. BAR ASS’N, 2018). 
75 Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors 
Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 48 (1991) (arguing that the vagueness of the charge to “do 
justice” “has significant costs” and “undermines professional discipline of prosecutorial 
misconduct.”); Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and 
Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301, 1301 (1996) (“When the ABA advises 
prosecutors to act as ‘ministers of justice’ or ‘administrators of justice,’ it is using juris-babble that 
is practically meaningless to prosecutors and to the ABA itself.”). 
76 Green & Levine, supra note 73, at 152. 
77 Bibas, supra note 14, at 976. 
78 Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 873, 
874 (2012); see also KATHLEEN M. RIDOL & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009 
(2010), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ncippubs/2 (finding a significant lack of State Bar 
discipline for prosecutorial misconduct in California); see also Mark C. Niles, A New Balance of 
Evils: Prosecutorial Misconduct, Iqbal, and the End of Absolute Immunity, 13 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & 
CIV. LIBERTIES 137, 148–54 (2017) (“Criminal culpability and/or professional sanction . . . have 
little if any impact on the actual practice of law in this country.”). 
79 Green & Levine, supra note 73, at 144 (noting that “proportionately fewer prosecutors are 
publicly disciplined when compared with private practitioners”). 
80 Bibas, supra note 14, at 977. 
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overall prosecutors are disciplined rarely even relative to other lawyers.81 It is certainly 
possible that broader ethics rules could be applied to prosecutors in some instances, but 
these rules may not extend to “reach abuses of prosecutorial charging discretion[.]”82 As a 
whole, while rules of professional conduct exist for prosecutors, they do not regulate 
prosecutor charging discretion. 
 
2.  ABA and NDAA Guidance 
 
National guidelines—from the ABA and NDAA—do not seek to limit prosecutor 
charging beyond what the evidence supports for a conviction. The ABA offers some 
guidance in the form of Criminal Justice Standards, but there is little specificity or 
limitations for prosecutors in these recommendations. For example, the ABA cautions that 
“[a] prosecutor should seek or file criminal charges only if the prosecutor reasonably 
believes that the charges are supported by probable cause, that admissible evidence will be 
sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge 
is in the interests of justice.”83 Critics have claimed that this probable cause requirement is 
“essentially meaningless” and the “sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction 
[standard] is likewise far too easily satisfied to provide any real limitation upon, or 
incentive to exercise, case-specific evaluation by the prosecutor.”84 The ABA standards 
make clear they are purely “aspirational” and “are not intended to serve as the basis for . . 
. professional discipline[.]”85 Similarly, the NDAA standards are “aspirational” and “are 
not intended to . . . be used by the judiciary in determining whether a prosecutor committed 
error or engaged in improper conduct; [or] be used by disciplinary agencies when passing 
upon allegations of violations of rules of ethical conduct[.]”86 The NDAA has expressed 
disagreement with the Rules of Professional Conduct on at least one occasion.87 The 
NDAA’s position seems to be that “prosecutors . . . should be exempt from state-court rules 
                                               
81 Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 755 
(2001). 
82 Green & Levine, supra note 73, at 153. 
83 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-4.3(a). 
84 Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 
669, 680–81 (1992); see also Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
259, 268 (2001) (“If probable cause is the only restriction on prosecutorial charging discretion, then 
it is a very broad power indeed.”). The ABA also encourages prosecutors to “make use of ethical 
guidance offered by existing organizations, and . . . to establish and make use of an ethics advisory 
group[.]”ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-1.2(d). 
85 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-1.1(b) (“These Standards . . . are 
aspirational or describe ‘best practices,’ and are not intended to serve as the basis for the imposition 
of professional discipline, to create substantive or procedural rights for accused or convicted 
persons, to create a standard of care for civil liability, or to serve as a predicate for a motion to 
suppress evidence or dismiss a charge.”). 
86 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 36, at Introduction. 
87 Brief for National District Attorneys Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
13, Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012) (taking issue with the obligation that Model Rule 3.8(d) places 
on prosecutors in the states in which it has been adopted). 
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of professional conduct that do more than mirror preexisting legal obligations.”88 Neither 
national body seeks to limit prosecutor discretion in charging. 
 
3.  Internal Standards of Individual Prosecutor Offices 
 
With a gap in national regulation,89 there is an argument that internal standards and 
regulations could serve an important role in limiting prosecutorial discretion.90 In most 
jurisdictions, chief prosecutors are elected and are therefore thought to be accountable to 
the public. “[H]ead prosecutors can align their subordinates’ actions with principals’ 
interests by writing down and enforcing procedural and substantive office policies.”91 Both 
the ABA and NDAA stress the importance of policies in individual prosecutor’s offices. 
According to the ABA, “[e]ach prosecutor’s office should seek to develop general policies 
to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion[.]”92 The NDAA standards clarify that 
“[i]nitial standards or guidelines for charging will be established by the chief prosecutor 
only[.]”93 
Despite guidance to formulate internal policies for prosecutors, there is little incentive 
to promulgate or follow such internal rules.94 One study indicated that prosecutors’ offices 
lacked effective policies or structures for proper accountability.95 Prosecutor offices may 
also lack clear standards guiding charging decisions.96 Prosecutorial guidelines governing 
charging and bargaining discretion “should be specific enough to provide genuine guidance 
when applied to a particular set of facts.”97 On a federal level, the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual “does contain some general standards for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, 
but they are written so broadly that they provide little guidance.”98 Prosecutors may not 
                                               
88 Green, supra note 78, at 886. 
89 Bibas, supra note 14, at 1016 (“Conventional external regulation has failed to guide 
prosecutors.”). 
90 Miller & Wright, supra note 6 (arguing that internal policies and regulations can be 
effective). 
91 Bibas, supra note 14, at 1003. 
92 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-2.4(a). 
93 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N,, supra note 36, at 4-2.4 Commentary. 
94 Vorenberg, supra note 9, at 1564–65 (“Few prosecutors’ offices, if left to their own devices, 
will promulgate guidelines that limit their freedom in a significant way, and courts are unlikely to 
require standards in the absence of legislative direction.”). 
95 Joel B. Rudin, The Supreme Court Assumes Errant Prosecutors Will Be Disciplined by Their 
Offices or the Bar: Three Case Studies that Prove that Assumption Wrong, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
537, 539 (2011) (presenting case studies from “three New York City District Attorneys’ Offices”; 
finding that the offices failed to discipline prosecutors and lacked codes of conduct). 
96 See Levine & Wright, supra note 42, at 1174 (finding that none of the offices studied in two 
Southeast metropolitan areas used “a charging or sentencing grid”). 
97 Vorenberg, supra note 9, at 1561–62. 
98 Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits 
for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 999 (1995); see also Amsler, supra note 
13, at 186  (noting that, aside from prosecution “on the basis of race, religion, or any other ‘arbitrary 
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want internal rules to be too specific. Courts have “consistently . . . ruled that a prosecutor’s 
failure to follow applicable written criteria cannot serve as a defense or cause of action.”99 
But fear of litigation or public review might prevent more specific written charging 
guidelines.100 One motivation that might lead prosecutors to “be reluctant to adopt 
[charging] polic[ies] is the fact that prosecutors have to run for election and any policy that 
might be seen as ‘soft’ on crime can raise a political issue that might put the prosecutor on 
the defensive.”101 Thus, formal and public guidelines “may result in guidelines that are 
considerably harsher than those policies that an office would be willing to live with on an 
informal basis.”102 Fear of public oversight and litigation may encourage prosecutors not 
to promulgate specific charging guidelines. 
Even when guidelines or charging grids exist, they may not be used. One study of 42 
misdemeanor and drug prosecutors in the Southeast found that none of the sites studied 
“employe[d] a charging or sentencing grid that prosecutors are supposed to follow[.]”103 In 
addition, a survey of prosecutors in 2018 found that although many prosecutors (65% of 
those surveyed) used data to set guidelines, they often did not use the data to track 
compliance with office guidance.104 Some scholars have noted that even when charging 
policies exist, they tend to have little impact on individual case evaluations by line 
prosecutors.105  
Charging guidelines, while an important step, may be limited in their efficacy.106 Our 
study questions prosecutors about whether they have internal standards or guidelines that 
guide their decision making and limit their charging ability. 
 
D.  Factors Relevant to Prosecutors in Charging Decisions 
 
There are no universal factors prosecutors must consider in charging decisions, except 
avoiding suspect classifications such as defendant’s race or national origin.107 The ABA 
                                               
classification’ or protected right,” charging decisions are “largely subject to nonmandatory 
guidelines.”). 
99 Peter Krug, Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 654 (2002); 
Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1366–67. 
100 Even when prosecutors offices have internal guidelines, they may oppose public 
transparency or review of such guidelines. Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1364. 
101 Id. at 1365. 
102 Id. 
103 Levine & Wright, supra note 42, at 1174. 
104 ROBIN OLSEN ET AL., URBAN INST. FOR JUSTICE, COLLECTING AND USING DATA FOR 
PROSECUTORIAL DECISIONMAKING 11–12 (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99044/collecting_and_using_data_for_prosec
utorial_decisionmaking_0.pdf. 
105 Melilli, supra note 84, at 683. 
106 Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1346 n.95 (“guidelines are oversold as a remedy for limiting 
prosecutorial discretion”). 
107 Green, supra note 71, at 614 (“[O]nce one gets beyond the obvious suspect classifications, 
there is no agreement on which considerations are or are not legitimate”). 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3893820
 BLACK BOX OF PROSECUTOR DISCRETION 19 
 
standards include a laundry list of potential factors prosecutors “may” consider when 
deciding whether to bring charges.108 For instance, the ABA standards encourage 
consideration of “the strength of the case,” “the extent . . . of harm caused,” and “the views 
and motives of the victim or complainant.”109 The NDAA standards include a similar 
lengthy list of factors that “may” be considered when screening potential charges.110 These 
NDAA standards allow consideration of “insufficiency of admissible evidence,” 
“availability of suitable diversion or rehabilitation programs,” and “[w]hether the size of 
the loss or the extent of the harm caused . . . is too small to warrant a criminal sanction.”111 
In addition, the NDAA standards list factors “that may be relevant” to whether the specific 
charges “are consistent with the interests of justice.”112 A Washington State Supreme Court 
                                               
108 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 35, at § 3-4.4(a) (“Among the factors 
which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising discretion to initiate, decline, or dismiss 
a criminal charge . . . are: (i) the strength of the case; (ii) the prosecutor’s doubt that the accused is 
in fact guilty; (iii) the extent or absence of harm caused by the offense; (iv) the impact of prosecution 
or non-prosecution on the public welfare; (v) the background and characteristics of the offender, 
including any voluntary restitution or efforts at rehabilitation; (vi) whether the authorized or likely 
punishment or collateral consequences are disproportionate in relation to the particular offense or 
the offender; (vii) the views and motives of the victim or complainant; (viii) any improper conduct 
by law enforcement; (ix) unwarranted disparate treatment of similarly situated persons; (x) potential 
collateral impact on third parties, including witnesses or victims; (xi) cooperation of the offender in 
the apprehension or conviction of others; (xii) the possible influence of any cultural, ethnic, 
socioeconomic or other improper biases; (xiii) changes in law or policy; (xiv) the fair and efficient 
distribution of limited prosecutorial resources; (xv) the likelihood of prosecution by another 
jurisdiction; and (xvi) whether the public’s interests in the matter might be appropriately vindicated 
by available civil, regulatory, administrative, or private remedies.”). 
109 Id. at § 3-4.4(a). 
110 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 36, at  4-1.3 (2009) (“Factors that may be considered 
in [the charging] decision include: a. Doubt about the accused’s guilt; b. Insufficiency of admissible 
evidence to support a conviction; c. The negative impact of a prosecution on a victim; d. The 
availability of adequate civil remedies; e. The availability of suitable diversion and rehabilitative 
programs; f. Provisions for restitution; g. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice 
authority; h. Whether non-prosecution would assist in achieving other legitimate goals, such as the 
investigation or prosecution of more serious offenses; i. The charging decisions made for similarly-
situated defendants; j. The attitude and mental status of the accused; l. A history of non-enforcement 
of the applicable law; m. Failure of law enforcement to perform necessary duties or investigations; 
n. The expressed desire of an accused to release potential civil claims against victims, witnesses, 
law enforcement agencies and their personnel, or the prosecutor and his personnel, where such 
desire is expressed after having the opportunity to obtain advice of counsel and is knowing and 
voluntary; o. Whether the alleged crime represents a substantial departure from the accused’s history 
of living a law-abiding life; p Whether the accused has already suffered substantial loss in 
connection with the alleged crime; q. Whether the size of the loss or the extent of the harm caused 
by the alleged crime is too small to warrant a criminal sanction[.]”). 
111 Id. at 4-1.3. 
112 Id. at  4-2.4 (relevant factors may include: “a. The nature of the offense, including whether 
the crime involves violence or bodily injury; b. The probability of conviction; c. The characteristics 
of the accused that are relevant to his or her blameworthiness or responsibility, including the 
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case specifically identified “the public interest as well as the strength of the case which 
could be proven” as relevant to a prosecutor’s decision “whether to charge suspects with 
criminal offenses.”113 Determining what factors prosecutors consider and how they are 
balanced is difficult, as prosecutors have resisted pleas to publish charging guidelines.114  
Prior research indicates that some common factors and considerations are important 
for prosecutor charging decisions. Theses include “the seriousness of the offense, the 
defendant’s prior criminal record, the victim’s interest in prosecution, the strength of the 
evidence, the likelihood of conviction, and the availability of alternative dispositions.”115 
Other factors traditionally considered by prosecutors in deciding whether to press charges 
include “the citizen’s education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and 
responsibilities, community ties, and the socioeconomic status of the offender.”116 Some 
of these factors are arguably not permissible, including education or socioeconomic status 
since they criminalize poverty and are associated with race.117 Other unstated factors for 
prosecutor charging include “internal rules, external resource constraints, and a balancing 
of interdependent relationships.”118 Office funding levels are also a factor in charging 
decisions, as limited resources require prioritization.119 And a progressive prosecutor may 
consider “whether [a defendant] ‘deserve[s],’ or the community benefits from” bringing 
charges.120 Our study will explore factors prosecutors claim are important to their charging 
decisions. 
 
E.  Declination 
 
                                               
accused’s criminal history; d. Potential deterrent value of incapacitating the accused in the event of 
a conviction; f. The willingness of the offender to cooperate with law enforcement; g. The 
defendant’s relative level of culpability in the criminal activity; h. The status of the victim, including 
the victim’s age or special vulnerability; j. Excessive costs of prosecution in relation to the 
seriousness of the offense; k. Recommendation of the involved law enforcement personnel; l. The 
impact of the crime on the community; m. Any other aggravating or mitigating circumstances.”). 
113 State v. Judge, 675 P.2d 219, 223 (Wash. 1984). 
114 Misner, supra note 9 at 744 (“Attempts to convince prosecutors to publish the guidelines 
for making prosecutorial charging decisions . . . have generally gone unheeded.”). 
115 Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 34–35 (1998). 
116 Pizzi, supra note 33, at 1368–69. 
117 Christopher Robertson, Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Race and Class: 
A Randomized Experiment with Prosecutors, 16 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 807 (2019) (arguing 
that consideration of socioeconomic status and education may be one cause of racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system).. 
118 Stemen & Frederick, supra note 46 at 83. 
119 Vorenberg,  supra note 9 at 1542–43 (“Funding levels determine how many cases can be 
brought and inevitably force prosecutors’ offices to give little or no attention to many chargeable 
crimes.”). 
120 Jeffrey Bellin, Defending Progressive Prosecution, 39 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. _ 
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 26). 
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Whether to bring charges, or decline, is entirely up to the prosecutor’s discretion.121 
Indeed, the prosecutor’s decision not to charge a case is largely unreviewable.122 The ABA 
standards clarify that there are some situations where charges may not be appropriate but 
fail to clarify when such a situation exists, only stating that “[t]he prosecutor should . . . 
consider, and where appropriate develop or assist in developing alternatives to 
prosecution[.]”123 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct clarify that a prosecutor 
should not bring a charge if the “prosecutor knows [the charge] is not supported by 
probable cause.”124 The NDAA standards do not include significant guidance covering 
when declination is appropriate. However, they do specify that prosecutor’s offices should 
maintain “a record of the reasons for declining a prosecution” where such record is 
“permitted by law.”125 
Common reasons for declination of charges include practical considerations or 
broader considerations of fairness. According to Angela Davis, “[t]he decision to forego 
charges may be based on practical considerations such as the triviality of the offense and/or 
the victim’s lack of interest in prosecution.126 This decision may also be based on 
considerations of fairness and justice in a particular case.”127 Richard Frase indicates that 
the declination decision is closely related to the offense in the case.128 A study of federal 
declination decisions in the Northern District of Illinois found that “the most common 
specific reason for declination was the state-prosecution alternative. In order, the next most 
frequently cited reasons were: small amount of loss by the victims; prior record of the 
defendant; small amount of contraband, such as drugs or guns; the isolated nature of the 
defendant’s act; and insufficient evidence of a criminal act.”129 However, there was a wide 
variety in reasons cited for declination.130 Categorizing these reasons into ten groups, 
“[m]inor offense appears most frequently, followed by state prosecution, insufficient 
evidence, and defendant characteristics.”131 A similar study of causes for prosecutor 
                                               
121 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has 
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision 
whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests 
entirely in his discretion.”). 
122 Misner, supra note 9 at 743. 
123 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 36 at § 3-1.2(e) (“The prosecutor should 
be knowledgeable about, consider, and where appropriate develop or assist in developing 
alternatives to prosecution or conviction[.]”). 
124 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, supra note 74 at r. 3.8(a). 
125 NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, supra note 36 at  4-1.7 (2009). 
126 Davis, supra note 24, at 409 
127 Id. 
128 Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 257 (1980) (finding that “importation of 
marijuana[,] . . . theft of government property, theft from interstate shipment, miscellaneous frauds, 
civil rights cases, and simple assaults” were “almost never prosecuted.”). 
129 Id. at 262. 
130 Id. (“[A] total of forty-three different reasons were cited in sample declinations.”). 
131 Id. at 262–65. 
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declination has not been conducted using a national sample of prosecutors. Our study will 
explore reasons why state prosecutors decline to bring cases. 
 
II.  NATIONAL PROSECUTOR STUDY DATA AND METHODS 
 
The data for this study of prosecutors comes from an experimental survey instrument 
administered to state and local prosecutors in 2017. The survey contained questions about 
how the respondents made charging decisions and demographic questions. The survey also 
contained a vignette, which consisted of fictional police reports describing a minor crime, 
and questions about what charging decision respondents would make based on the facts 
presented and stipulated laws of the jurisdiction. The vignette manipulated the race and 
social class of the defendant so that we could assess the impact of these status 
characteristics on prosecutors’ charging decisions. The findings from the experiment 
portion of the study, showing no evidence of race or class bias on prosecutors’ charging 
decisions, have been previously published.132   
This article presents additional findings from responses to the vignette questions as 
well as quantitative findings from the survey questions about how prosecutors make 
decisions in other cases. Additionally, this study presents findings from qualitative analysis 
of prosecutors’ responses to open-ended survey questions about decision making. 
 
A.  Sample 
 
We were interested in how state and local (not federal) prosecutors make charging 
decisions, but unfortunately there is no list of all such prosecutors. We had hoped to be 
able to partner with professional associations to which prosecutors belong to obtain the 
names and contact information of affiliated prosecutors, but those groups declined to 
cooperate. We thus created our own sample of state and local prosecutors. 
To ensure our sample contained prosecutors from across the country, we selected one 
to two states from each of the nine U.S. Census Bureau regions and conducted web searches 
for state and local prosecutors’ names and email addresses. Some state websites list all 
state employees, including prosecutors. More often, however, if a government website 
listed the names and contact information for prosecutors, this information was available on 
county websites. Many counties opt only to list the name of the head prosecutor, however, 
so we also used state bar association websites to collect names and contact information for 
members who indicated they were or had been state or local prosecutors. Finally, we 
submitted Freedom of Information Act requests to states for lists of their prosecutors and 
email addresses. Our final sample included 4,484 state and local prosecutors.133 
We then emailed those prosecutors inviting them to participate in the study,134 which 
we hosted on Qualtrics. Upon completion of the study, respondents could request a gift 
                                               
132 Robertson et al., supra note 117. 
133 This is not a representative sample. And there is bias in who opted or declined to participate 
in this study. Some head prosecutors opted out on behalf of their entire office. 
134 This study was approved by the University of Utah Institutional Review Board. 
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card to Amazon in the amount of five dollars. Ultimately, 542 prosecutors completed the 
survey for a response rate of 12.09 percent.  
A detailed description of the sample can be seen in Table 1.135 Most respondents were 
men (65.85%), white (90.26%), and not Hispanic (96.07%). The average age of 
respondents was 46 years, and respondents averaged about twelve and a half years as a 
prosecutor. 22.55% of respondents were the head prosecutor in their office. The average 
office size was about 35 prosecutors. Most respondents were from the Mountain (24.07%), 
Midwest (21.3%), and South Atlantic (14.63%) regions.136 Many respondents were 
prosecutors in jurisdictions containing less than 100,000 people (42.49%) or between 
100,000 and 500,000 people (28.58%). 
 
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics 
  Percent of Sample or Mean 
Recommended Disposition of Case    
 Felony Charge 16.05% 
 Monetary Penalty 41.68% 
 Average Amount of Monetary Penalty $247.21 
 Confinement 27.83% 
 Average Minimum Days of Confinement 25.73 days 
Jurisdiction Characteristics    
 Average Size of Office 34.83 prosecutors 
 Size of Jurisdiction    
    Over 2,000,000 people 7.42% 
    1,000,000-2,000,000 people 10.76% 
    500,000-1,000,000 people 10.76% 
    100,000-500,000 people 28.58% 
    Less than 100,000 people 42.49% 
 Region     
                                               
135 A similar table appeared in Robertson et al., supra note 117. The sample description 
reported here differs slightly because in our prior work we eliminated some responses based on the 
time a respondent spent on the study as a quality control mechanism to ensure the integrity of the 
experimental portion of the study. For a description, see Robertson et al., supra note 117, at 819. 
136 The regional breakdown is as follows. 
New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, or 
Vermont 
Middle Atlantic: New Jersey, New York, or Pennsylvania 
Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, or Wisconsin 
West North Central: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, or South 
Dakota 
South Atlantic: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Virginia, or West Virginia 
East South Central: Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, or Tennessee 
West South Central: Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, or Oklahoma 
Mountain: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, or Wyoming 
Pacific: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, or Washington 
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    New England 4.44% 
    Middle Atlantic 3.52% 
    Midwest 21.30% 
    West North Central 10.93% 
    South Atlantic 14.63% 
    East South Central 8.52% 
    West South Central  0.93% 
    Mountain 24.07% 
    Pacific 11.67% 
Prosecutor Characteristics    
 Average Number of Years as Prosecutor 12.52 years 
 Head Prosecutor 22.55% 
 Average Age 46.02 years 
 Gender    
    Male 65.86% 
    Female 34.14% 
 Race    
    White 90.26% 
    Black/African American 3.93% 
    American Indian/Alaska Native 0.56% 
    Asian 1.12% 
    Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 0.19% 
    Other 3.93% 
 Hispanic    
    No 96.07% 
    Mexican/Mexican American/Chicano 1.50% 
    Puerto Rican 0.19% 
    Cuban 0.94% 
    Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino 1.31% 
 
B.  Instrument 
 
Our survey contained 23 questions with some follow up probes. The survey asked 
prosecutors some screening questions to ensure that they were or had been prosecutors. 
They then were asked to read two fictional police reports about a relatively minor crime 
for which prosecutors could have recommended various charges or no charges at all. In the 
vignette, a man at a train station was arrested for, in the words of one arresting officer, 
“yelling obscenities, stopping patrons for money, and brandishing a knife.” The man was 
emotionally distressed from a recent break up with his girlfriend and needed money for a 
train ride, but when no one gave him any money, he became more upset. One witness 
reported that the man, while holding a knife, had grabbed a woman’s arm after she refused 
to give him money, but did not hurt or threaten her. Although people at the train station 
were scared, no one was physically hurt. The man submitted to an arrest without incident. 
We then provided sample criminal statutes and sentencing guidelines and asked 
prosecutors what charges they would bring, if any. We also asked respondents what 
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monetary penalty or term of confinement they would recommend, if any, and the reasoning 
for their recommendation. These were open-ended questions, and a text box was provided 
for respondents to write their penalty recommendations and reasoning.   
We then asked a series of five close-ended questions about how respondents make 
charging and plea-bargaining decisions in their office and provided space for respondents 
to provide additional explanations if they desired. The survey concluded with eleven 
questions about respondents’ office, jurisdiction, and demographic characteristics. We 
designed the study to take approximately 15 minutes to complete and piloted it with 
prosecutors in Salt Lake City.137  
 
C.  Method 
 
As noted above, we have previously reported some findings from the experimental 
portion of the study. In this paper, we report additional quantitative and qualitative analysis 
of respondents’ punishment recommendations for the defendant described in the vignette 
as well as descriptions of respondents’ prosecutorial decision-making process. We present 
descriptive results from frequency distributions using the data from the close-ended survey 
questions. The study also yielded qualitative data from the text that respondents provided 
to the survey questions, which we transformed into quantitative data for purposes of 
reporting descriptive statistics. We also coded qualitative data from the survey questions 
and the experimental portion of the study inductively based on themes that emerged from 
the data. 
 
III.  RESULTS OF NATIONAL PROSECUTOR STUDY 
 
This part explains the results of our national prosecutor study. Part III.A. reviews the 
recommended charges and penalties imposed by respondents for the hypothetical crime 
they reviewed. Part III.B. reviews the various reasons respondents provide to support their 
decisions. Some of these reasons include that respondents believe punishment is necessary 
despite the fact that this is a minor crime. Others note financial or mental health condition 
of the defendant, and others specifically note that a little jail time could teach the defendant 
a lesson. After the respondents answered questions about the vignette, we then asked 
respondents about how prosecutors in their office make charging decisions. We asked who 
makes the charging decision, whether the crime is a felony or misdemeanor changes the 
decision-making process, who prosecutes the case after decisions are made about charging, 
and whether their office has internal guidelines or standards governing charging decisions. 
The prosecutor responses about the general process for making charging decisions is 
recounted in Part III.C. 
 
A.  Recommended Charges and Penalties 
 
Respondents could choose from a range of charges to bring in response to the arrest 
described in the vignette or to bring no charges at all. The below figure shows that just 18 
                                               
137 See Appendix for the instrument. 
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respondents declined to bring no charges, and that almost 80% of respondents brought 
multiple charges. The mean number of charges recommended was 3.15 [CI 2.99, 3.31], 
and the maximum number of charges recommended was 11 (the maximum number of 




There was variation in the number of charges recommended by region in which the 
respondent worked as a prosecutor. See Table 2 for the mean number of charges 
recommended by region, as well as the range of charges recommended by region. 
 
Table 2—Number of Charges by Region 
 






New England 2.88 0 8 
Middle Atlantic 4.37 1 10 
Midwest 2.45 0 10 
West North Central 3.39 0 8 
South Atlantic 3.82 0 11 
East South Central 2.83 0 6 
West South Central 3.2 2 6 
Mountain 3.25 0 10 
Pacific 3.11 1 8 
 
There was one felony charge that respondents could select, and 16% opted to charge 
the defendant with a felony (see Table 1).138 There was variation in whether a felony was 
                                               
138 Similar results for outcome variables of interest appeared in Robertson et al., supra note 
117. The results reported here differ slightly because in our prior work we eliminated some 
responses based on the time a respondent spent on the study as a quality control mechanism to ensure 
 










Figure 1. Number of  Charges
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charged by region in which the respondent worked as a prosecutor. See below Figure for 
the percentage of respondents who recommended a felony charge by region. Notably, the 
South Atlantic region prosecutors were most likely to recommend a felony charge, 




While the vast majority of respondents would bring multiple charges, far fewer 
recommended a monetary penalty. Almost 60% of respondents recommended no monetary 
penalty in this instance, although there was significant variation by region. All West South 
Central prosecutors recommended a monetary penalty. 
 
                                               
the integrity of the experimental portion of the study. For a description, see Robertson et al., supra 






































































Figure 2. Felony Charge by Region
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Of those who did recommend a monetary penalty, the recommended amount tended 
to be less than $500 (mean recommended monetary penalty was $247.21 [CI $200.05, 
$294.37] (see Table 1). It is important to note, however, that some respondents did 





The amount of monetary penalty recommended also varied by region, shown in the 
below table. The minimum monetary penalty in all regions was zero, except in West South 




































































Figure 3. Monetary Penalty by Region








Figure 4. Minimum Monetary Penalty
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Table 3—Amount of Monetary Penalty by Region 
 
Region Mean Monetary Penalty Maximum Monetary 
Penalty 
New England $10.87 $250 
Middle Atlantic $88.89 $750 
Midwest $191.83 $5,000 
West North Central $138.46 $1,000 
South Atlantic $355.84 $2,500 
East South Central $202.22 $1,000 
West South Central $500 $500 
Mountain $359.17 $5,000 
Pacific $215.74 $2,500 
 
Respondents were even less likely to recommend confinement. Over 70% of 





Of those who did recommend confinement, the recommendation tended to be less than 
30 days in jail (mean recommended days of confinement was 25.73 days [CI 17.37, 34.10] 
(see Table 1).139 See below figure for the distribution of recommendations for minimum 
days of confinement. 
 
                                               
139 Some respondents recommended a year in jail (11), and two respondents recommended 







































































Figure 5. Confinement by Region
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The days of confinement recommended varied by region in which the prosecutor 
worked. The minimum number of days of confinement recommended was zero in each 
region. See below table. 
  









Figure 6. Minimum Days of  Confinement
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Table 4—Minimum Days of Confinement by Region 
 
Region Mean Days  Maximum Days  
 
New England 5.22 90 
Middle Atlantic 22.94 180 
Midwest 17.81 365 
West North Central 17.37 365 
South Atlantic 53.81 1500 
East South Central 18.93 365 
West South Central 0 0 
Mountain 26.01 720 
Pacific 25.69 365 
 
As indicated by the above figures, we found extremely wide heterogeneity in how 
respondents resolved the exact same case. Although 18 respondents resolved the case 
without pressing any charges, the modal respondent imposed two charges, and some sought 
seven or more. Similarly, although many respondents sought no monetary penalty at all, 
and the modal respondent who sought a monetary penalty sought $500 or less, some 
demanded as much as $5,000. Most strikingly, we saw many respondents resolving the 
case without any jail time, but others demanding a month, or even up to two years in one 
case. And there was significant variability in the number of charges and recommended 
punishment by respondents’ region. 
 
B.  Reasons for Recommendations 
 
Beyond asking prosecutors to charge the hypothetical case, we were also interested in 
why prosecutors decided to make specific recommendations. We thus asked respondents 
to explain their reasoning for their charging and penalty recommendations.140 This question 
was not mandatory, but many respondents chose to explain their reasoning, and we coded 
the responses for common themes, presented below. The five common themes provided 
for prosecutors recommendations are described in Part III.B.1 necessity of punishment 
despite a minor crime; Part III.B.2 the financial state of offender; Part III.B.3 the mental 
state of offender; Part III.B.4 the benefit of jail time for offender; and Part III.B.5 plea 
bargaining considerations. 
 
1.  Necessity of Punishment, Despite Minor Crime 
 
A large group of prosecutors recommended punishment for defendant, despite their 
recognition that this was a minor crime. Nearly half of respondents (230) observed that the 
crime was relatively minor. Many respondents described the conduct using phrases like 
“No big deal,” “Relatively minor offenses,” and “The crime is de minimus, and no one was 
                                               
140 Respondents were directed to “Please write a couple of sentences explaining your decision 
in the scenario that you reviewed.” 
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harmed.” Such respondents framed the offender’s conduct as part of a “bad day” that 
resulted in no consequential harm and did not view the defendant as a threat to public safety 
or likely to reoffend. 
Despite understanding the crime to be minor, more than half of these respondents 
(115) still recommended some sort of penalty. Respondents who felt that some punishment 
was warranted despite the lack of harm tended to use a monetary penalty instead of 
confinement (82 recommended imposing a fine or court costs, and of this group, eight 
mentioned that community service could be used to pay the monetary penalty).141 
Respondents who only imposed a monetary penalty focused on wanting to deter future 
bad conduct, but noted that jail was not warranted given that there was no public threat and 
that incarceration would be harmful to the offender. A junior prosecutor in the Mountain 
region who recommended a $600 monetary penalty and no jail time wrote, “While some 
punishment may be necessary, such as a fine, in order to deter the Defendant from 
committing the same acts under similar circumstances, I don’t think jail would be 
beneficial for anyone in this case.” Similarly, a junior prosecutor from the Pacific region 
who recommended a $100 fine explained: “I believe in this case a minimal monetary 
sanction with a suspended sentence would get the point across . . . that his behavior is not 
appropriate, but would also not blow the situation/incident out of proportion.” A midcareer 
prosecutor from the South Atlantic region respondent who recommended probation and a 
fine between $350–$500 wrote, “I want something that takes it seriously that a person is 
possibly drunk and wielding a weapon but also an opportunity to take responsibility 
without facing the worst sentence.” 
Some monetary penalty recommendations were more severe, however. A prosecutor 
from the Pacific region with 20 years experience who recommended a $2,500 fine wrote, 
“There needs to be some accountability, but no one was actually injured and I think the 
negative impact of a felony or a jail sentence is disproportionate to the harm imposed by 
the defendant’s actions in this case. I think a large fine and suspended sentence are 
appropriate.” 
Some respondents appeared to impose a fine to further different criminal justice 
purposes, such as increasing funding for law enforcement. A junior prosecutor from the 
Mountain region who recommended only $100 fine wrote, “I don’t believe he needs to be 
incarcerated. The fines go towards furthering police work and programs that help people 
with behavioral health issues.” 
Some respondents offered evidence-based reasons for recommending a monetary 
penalty instead of jail time. A junior prosecutor from the Midwest who recommended a 
$500 fine plus court costs argued, “Additionally studies show that jail for someone who is 
low risk like this defendant could actually do more damage by exposing him to high risk 
individuals or jeopardizing his career through the period of incarceration.” A Midwest 
prosecutor with almost 30 years of experience who recommended only $100 fine plus court 
                                               
141 Seven respondents chose to recommend only a term of confinement, and 26 recommended 
both a term of confinement and a monetary penalty. One respondent who recommended two days 
in jail and a $500 fine plus court costs wrote, “People make mistakes. No one was hurt, and this man 
doesn’t appear to need to be locked away for life based on one bad day. The goal is to make it sting 
a bit, and give him the tools to make that behavior obsolete so he doesn’t re-offend.” 
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costs observed, “Evidence based decision making informs us that low risk offenders tend 
to be self correcting and that placing them on probation and /or incarcerating them will do 
more harm than good. I prefer to defer him in a First Offender program if possible, and if 
not a monetary fine should be sufficient retribution.” 
Many did not view any punishment as necessary, however. A midcareer prosecutor 
from the Mountain region wrote, “I would decline to prosecute … because I do not feel 
that he is a danger to the community, nor do I believe this would be a good use of resources. 
Just because acts fit the definition of a crime does not mandate that a person be prosecuted. 
This is why prosecutors have discretion.” A midcareer New England prosecutor wrote, “I 
do believe that this conduct is properly classified as criminal, but it is pretty minor, and he 
has no record, so the proverbial ‘slap on the wrist is appropriate.” An experienced 
prosecutor from the Mountain region described their reasoning for no punitive sanctions as 
follows: “I considered the social harm (low) of the offense and the ascertainable risk of 
future crime (low). I also considered the seriousness of the crime category (low). I 
concluded that the suspect would be a good candidate for a diversion or “deferred 
prosecution.” A midcareer prosecutor from the South Atlantic region similarly noted, “First 
time offender, there’s nothing that incarceration can do on this case that probation can’t.”  
Several respondents mentioned rehabilitation as a motivation for not imposing 
punishment and wanted to connect the offender to additional resources like anger 
management counseling, conflict resolution courses, substance abuse treatment, and 
mental health treatment. Still mindful of the negative impact on the victim of the crime, a 
junior prosecutor in the Mountain region who recommended no punishment wrote, “I 
included the letter of apology to give [Defendant] an opportunity to express any remorse 
he has over his behavior as well as to provide a way for the named victim to feel her distress 
was acknowledged and also so she is aware the judicial system responded to this situation.” 
Overall, a large number of prosecutors deemed this crime to be a minor one, although 
at least half of them still imposed a monetary penalty or jail time. 
 
2.  Considering the Financial State of Offender 
 
A subset of prosecutors specifically noted the financial state of the offender, and 
considered this in their decision to charge. Many respondents (58) explicitly considered the 
financial state of the offender when recommending punishment. Often, monetary penalties 
were not imposed because, given the scenario presented, respondents did not believe that 
the offender would be able to pay. Some still felt that some sort of community restitution 
was necessary, and so recommended community service in lieu of a monetary penalty. As 
a junior prosecutor from the South Atlantic region observed, “I would not ask for a 
monetary penalty because if he cannot afford a train ticket, he likely cannot afford a 
monetary penalty.” This respondent recommended 10 hours of community service in lieu 
of a fine. A junior prosecutor from the Mountain region who also recommended 
community service in lieu of a monetary penalty because of the defendant’s inability to 
pay wrote, “Given that he was asking for money, it did not seem practical, or indeed useful 
to require a fine. Instead, I would ask for something that would benefit the community—
that being community service.”   
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Given the offender’s perceived inability to pay a monetary penalty, several 
respondents thought imposing one may be too burdensome. One such respondent, a head 
prosecutor in the Mountain region with three years of experience, wrote that they would 
not impose a monetary penalty because “He would just be back in jail for not paying fines 
which exceeds the scope of conduct that we should be punishing here.” 
Some who thought the monetary penalty would be too burdensome recommended 
connecting the offender to social services. A Midwest junior prosecutor noted that given 
that “He was desperate for money, [monetary penalties] would not seem to do any good, 
but to make the problem worse” and recommended probation and treatment. A midcareer 
prosecutor from the Mountain region recommended connecting the offender to “housing 
support and job skills along with possible substance abuse counseling and treatment” 
combined with supervision in lieu of a monetary penalty given the offender’s perceived 
lack of means to pay. 
Some respondents who recognized that a monetary penalty would be too burdensome 
for the offender instead opted for imposing a term of confinement; that is, they substituted 
jail for a fine. One South Atlantic prosecutor with over 20 years of experience observed 
that “A fine would be onerous” given that the offender had no money. In order to address 
the fact that the alleged conduct upset the public, however, this respondent recommended 
10 days of confinement. This prosecutor failed to recognize the costs of 10 days of 
confinement would likely be more than a monetary penalty given that defendant was 
employed.142 
Other respondents who recognized that the offender may not be able to afford a fine 
still imposed a monetary penalty, but seemed to reduce the amount they would normally 
recommend. One such respondent, a Midwest head prosecutor with three years of 
experience, stated, “I only asked for $500.00 because from the fact scenario it sounded like 
money is an issue for this person. I utilize the phrase ‘You can’t squeeze blood from a 
turnip’ in cases like this.” A midcareer prosecutor from the Mountain region observed, “It 
does not seem like he has much money which is why a $350 fine will still be a stiff penalty 
without being unfairly burdensome.” A junior Midwest prosecutor who recommended a 
fine of up to $500 wrote, “It seems like this is a mental health/poverty issue rather than 
there being any real criminal intent.” 
Some respondents also focused on the offender’s employment status to justify 
imposition of a monetary penalty. One midcareer Midwest prosecutor recommended a 
$500 monetary penalty and wrote, “The defendant is gainfully employed with no prior 
record and can afford to pay a fine.” Another respondent similarly justified a $1,000 fine. 
One respondent wanted more information about the offender’s financial state prior to 
making a recommendation about imposing a monetary penalty. This experienced 
prosecutor from the South Atlantic region wrote, “I would actually want more information 
about his. Is he employed? Would a fine set him up for a violation because of an inability 
to pay? I think that it is reasonable to levy a monetary sanction but inability to pay cannot 
be ignored in my evaluation.” 
                                               
142 Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2017) 
(“[T]he value of lost freedom to pretrial detainees may be as high as $6,770 for the least dangerous 
defendants.”). 
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In sum, there was significant variability amongst respondents considering the 
financial state of the offender in terms of what they recommended. Overall, prosecutors 
seemed to try to tailor their punishments to what they deemed was affordable for defendant, 
although some imposed jail time even though that could be much more costly in the long 
run. 
 
3.  Mental Health Considerations 
 
It was common for respondents to consider the defendant’s mental or emotional 
health, as well as potential substance abuse. Many respondents, assuming no prior criminal 
history, recommended mental health assessments because they viewed this as the cause of 
the alleged behavior, and several mentioned diversion to mental health court. 147 
respondents (27.12%) mentioned mental health when explaining their reasoning for 
imposing (or not) a monetary penalty or term of confinement. 46 other respondents (8.49%) 
mentioned counseling or treatment. 29 other respondents (4.06%) mentioned anger 
management. In all, 222 respondents (40.96%) considered the mental health or emotional 
needs of the defendant. 
Many respondents concerned about the offender’s mental health opted for no 
punishment.  As one head prosecutor with three years of experience in the West North 
Central region wrote, “While the defendant’s behavior meets the technical requirements of 
the crimes marked, it appears that his behavior may be resulting from either a mental health 
or anger management issue. Therefore, my primary motivation is correct the problem, 
rather than to simply seek punishment. This is especially true of a first-time offender. If 
the defendant is willing to participate in a mental health screening and any treatment 
recommended by the screening, that will most likely do more to ensure the safety of the 
community than will a fine or a jail sentence.” 
The lack of physical harm was also often paired with concerns about the offender’s 
mental health to justify no negative sanctions. One head prosecutor with ten years of 
experience in the Mountain region conveyed, “[Defendant]’s behavior appears to be the 
result an acute mental disorder or emotional disturbance. It makes sense to me to provide 
him with an incentive to address the underlying issues. Had anyone been injured by his 
behavior my analysis would be different.” 
Several respondents who did not impose a term of confinement or a monetary penalty 
recognized that the offender needed additional help. One head prosecutor with almost 30 
years of experience in the West North Central region observed, “This appears to be a 
troubled person with needs beyond the criminal justice system.” 
Others who recommended no punishment wanted to connect the offender to services 
necessary for rehabilitation. One head prosecutor with five years of experience in the West 
North Central region who sought no punishment recommended “drug/alcohol examination 
and/or a mental health examination with follow-up treatment as recommended, as that 
seems to be the root cause of the situation.”143 An experienced Midwest prosecutor who 
likewise did not recommend a term of confinement or a monetary penalty wrote, “If the 
                                               
143 The same prosecutor also noted that “[i]f the defendant had a long history of this sort of 
behavior, my recommendation would be different.” 
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man has no criminal history, it would appear that this is a mental health issue. I would like 
to put him on probation and order treatment.”   
Sometimes respondents thought that the prospect of future punishment was necessary 
to facilitate mental health treatment. One head prosecutor in the Midwest region with 16 
years of experience who recommended no punishment wrote, “Appears to be a mental 
health incident. I would be satisfied with a stick (or carrot) to coerce him to receive some 
mental health services.” A midcareer Midwest prosecutor who recommended suspended 
confinement and a fine wrote, “I would recommended probation (suspended sentence) 
based on the apparent rehabilitative needs; specifically alcohol treatment, mental health 
treatment, and anger management. It is premature to impose jail, however, should he fail 
on probation or reject probation, I would recommend a jail sentence.” A head prosecutor 
with three years of experience in the Pacific region who recommended a suspended jail 
sentence wrote, “Best thing for community safety is for him to get the help he needs. Jail 
hanging over his head provides an incentive for him to get into treatment.” 
Some respondents focused on balancing need for mental health treatment with 
punishment. A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended a 
suspended sentence of 200 days in jail wrote, “To me justice in this situation is a balance 
between punishing the defendant for the disruption of peace and preventing the defendant 
from reoffending by ensuring that he receives the substance abuse treatment and potential 
mental health treatment that he needs.” 
Despite the mental health issues latent in the vignette, not all respondents who 
recognized that the incident could have been caused by mental health problems opted not 
to impose a punishment. Of these 222 respondents, 12 recommended a term of 
confinement, 10 recommended a monetary penalty, and six recommended both.144 Some 
respondents concerned about the mental health status of the offender recommended only a 
fine. One very junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region recommended a $750 fine and 
wrote, “They were not in danger of being injured. This is more than likely a mental health 
issue or a one time occurrence triggered by the issue with his girlfriend.” Another junior 
South Atlantic prosecutor recommended a $500 fine and wrote, “This sounds likely to be 
a mental health related or possibly substance abuse related. A 29 year old with no previous 
criminal history exhibiting this kind of behavior would likely benefit from some kind of 
treatment significantly more than confinement or excessive fines.” A midcareer South 
Atlantic prosecutor recommended diverting the offender to mental health court and 
imposing a $250-$500 fine, writing, “evidence that this episode may have been exacerbated 
by alcohol and/or mental health issues which would be treatable, preventing future violence 
and obviating the need for incarceration to keep the community safe.” 
Some respondents thought that a term of confinement was appropriate despite 
evidence of mental health issues, focusing on the need for accountability. An experienced 
South Atlantic prosecutor who recommended 10 days in jail and a $750 fine wrote, “It 
sounds like a mental health issue. The sentence will have conditions that require a mental 
health evaluation. His lack of criminal history played into my decision to go low on 
                                               
144 Five respondents recommended community service in lieu of confinement or a monetary 
penalty, and two recommended the offender be mandated to receive counseling in lieu of 
punishment. 
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confinement, but because he did pose a threat to the woman, he should be punished with 
some period of incarceration.” A Middle Atlantic prosecutor with over 25 years of 
experience who recommended up to four months in jail and a $750 fine wrote, “I would 
seek 4 months in jail. However, if the defendant sought counseling etc., and had no further 
arrests while the case is pending, I’d consider a lesser jail sentence. While the defendant 
might have mental health issues, he also created a dangerous situation in which the public 
felt obliged to flee from a public place for their own safety.” An experienced Midwest 
prosecutor who recommended four days in jail along with a $500 fine wrote, “My main 
concern with this scenario is to make sure there was some accountability for the suspect’s 
actions but it appears there may be some underlying emotional or mental health issues that 
need to be addressed. I would see if there could be a referral for a mental health exam.” 
Other respondents seeking a term of confinement focused on the presence of a knife. 
A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended a year in jail stated, 
“But for the knife he would have likely received a term of probation with a condition of 
seeking mental health treatment.” An experienced Midwest prosecutor recommended a 65-
day term of confinement in a psychiatric facility, five years of probation, and a $500 fine 
and asserted, “He needs evaluation and treatment, but needs to learn consequences of 
actions, he caused public fear to several people and was willing to touch another and 
brandish a knife.” 
Some only recommended a short period of confinement in order to ensure that there 
was sufficient time to conduct a mental health assessment. A midcareer Midwest 
prosecutor who recommended two days in jail along with a $200 fine wrote, “The 2 day 
time period is really just to ensure that the person can be assessed by community mental 
health to see if treatment is necessary before release.” 
Further, some respondents considered the mental health of the offender and concluded 
that there was no mental illness and that punishment was thus appropriate. An experienced 
head prosecutor in the Mountain region recommended 180 days in jail and noted, “This 
person does not appear to suffer from a cognizable mental illness to further mitigate or 
offer a basis for some kind of diversion. Therefor some incarceration would be appropriate 
followed by a probationary period to ensure the defendant’s continued lawfulness.” 
Respondents who considered mental health varied not only in what types of 
punishment they recommended, but also in their perception of the offender’s danger to the 
community. A midcareer prosecutor in the West North Central region who recommended 
only a mental health evaluation wrote, “There is nothing to indicate he would need to be 
incarcerated for . . . the safety of the community.” While an experienced head prosecutor 
from the South Atlantic region who imposed a $500 fine and two years of probation wrote, 
“He needs mental help but he’s clearly a danger to the community.” Some viewed the 
offender as more of a danger to himself than society. A junior prosecutor in the East South 
Central region recommended that “[Defendant have] an opportunity to rehabilitate himself, 
eg participate in AA or some other court approved drug and alcohol program, and any 
psychiatric referral” because “Due to any lack of intent to harm others (I saw him more 
likely to harm himself), I would much rather see someone given a chance and assistance 
than pop them with a charge even a misdemeanor who is employed and allow him to be 
contributing society member.” 
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Overall, a large number of prosecutors noted mental health concerns in their charging 
decisions, and those who noted such concerns largely decided not to impose jail time or a 
monetary fine. However, some prosecutors imposed jail time and monetary penalties 
despite recognizing potential mental health issues. 
 
4.  Using Jail to Teach a Lesson 
 
The vast majority of respondents did not think confinement was appropriate, and those 
who did recommend a term of confinement tended to recommend under 30 days in jail, 
with most opting to impose fewer than 10 days. When explaining their recommendations 
for seeking a term of confinement, many respondents (45/145) explicitly indicated that a 
short stay in jail was warranted to teach defendant a lesson.145 
Some respondents focused on using jail to teach a lesson. One head prosecutor with 
over 30 years of experience in the West North Central region who recommended the 
offender serve two days in jail and pay $1,000 fine wrote, “Potentially serious 
consequences of his stupidity but lucky this time - no one hurt - and no record; 2 days in 
jail lets him see what jail is like and why he needs a smarter game plan in the future to 
avoid getting in trouble.” A midcareer prosecutor in the Midwest who recommended two 
days in jail along with a $200 fine wrote that they wanted to “impress upon the suspect the 
inappropriateness of the conduct, without unduly penalizing the individual.” An 
experienced head prosecutor from the West South Central region recommended up to three 
days in jail and a $500 fine and observed, “People make mistakes. No one was hurt, and 
this man doesn’t appear to need to be locked away for life based on one bad day. The goal 
is to make it sting a bit, and give him the tools to make that behavior obsolete so he doesn’t 
re-offend.” 
An experienced prosecutor in the West North Central region who recommended four 
days in jail along with a $200 monetary penalty noted, “The four days is to remind him that 
he really screwed up and scared people.” A prosecutor in the Pacific region with 20 years 
of experience recommended five days in jail and stated that, “While the action alarmed 
people, no physical harm was done. Def[endant] has no record, and was upset. I would 
treat this as a first time offense with 5 days to hold him accountable for people alarmed.” 
A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended 10 days in jail along 
with a $500 fine justified their decision as follows: “However, displaying a knife in a 
crowded public place could have lead to disastrous results. If someone in the station had a 
gun they could have started shooting and people could have been seriously injured; so some 
jail time is necessary to make him understand the seriousness of his actions. However, 
given that he cooperated with police, immediately handing over the knife, and never 
actually brandished the knife at anyone, I do not feel that an excessive amount of jail time 
is necessary. Just enough time to make him think.” 
Some respondents who thought a short stay in jail would teach the defendant a lesson 
recommended a term of confinement that was more severe than others. A junior prosecutor 
in the Pacific region recommended 60 days in jail and wrote, “As for consequences, I find 
                                               
145 Others thought lengthier jail sentences were warranted given that a knife was present, which 
posed a significant danger to the public. 
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this serious as he used a deadly weapon to scare multiple people and even went so far to 
grab a woman’s arm. . . . But, these facts are mitigated by no criminal history even after 
being 18 for 10 years, cooperative with police officers, no physical injuries, and no pointing 
the knife at any person. So, some actual jail time to impart seriousness of his conduct but 
minimal with hope that those 60 days will scare him straight.” 
Other respondents seemed to use jail as a lesson both for the defendant and others in 
hopes of a deterrent effect. A head prosecutor with 1.5 years of experience in the Mountain 
region who recommended 10 days of confinement and a $1,000 monetary penalty asserted 
that, “The knife and assault are both significant factors to me. People were literally 
endangered by the actions of Mr. [Johnson] and that kind of behavior, though apparently 
the first time Mr. Johnson exhibited such behavior, deserves a strong message: If you 
commit a felony that literally endangers the lives of others, the State takes those actions 
seriously.” Similarly, a midcareer head prosecutor in the West North Central region who 
recommended 30 days in jail plus a $500 fine reasoned, “I don’t believe a severe penalty 
is warranted . . . [but] there needs to be sufficient response to deter others from committing 
similar acts and for the public to have confidence that people who cause these kinds of 
disturbances will be dealt with appropriately.” A junior prosecutor in the Mountain region 
who recommended 30 days of confinement plus an unspecified fine wrote, “This case 
presents a public safety issue that I believe would require a jail sentence to send a message 
to the community that this is the type of behavior we as a society will not tolerate.” Others, 
however, thought that confinement was inappropriate given no evidence of a prior criminal 
record and the cost of confinement. An experienced head prosecutor in the South Atlantic 
region wrote, “A sentence of confinement also does not serve justice as this defendant has 
no prior record and the taxpayer would be bearing the ultimate burden.”  
Overall, a surprisingly large number of prosecutors opted to chose jail time as a tool 
to teach defendant a lesson, although others did this to deter others from similar behavior. 
 
5.  Plea Bargaining Motivations and Strategies 
 
Plea negotiations were mentioned by 71 respondents when explaining their charging 
decisions and punishment recommendations. Respondents were thinking about a variety of 
factors when discussing pleas including dropping charges as a plea negotiation tool, 
building a criminal history, leaving room for victim input, or pressing charges to 
incentivize mental health or other treatment. 
Some were considering the defendant’s possible future criminal offenses and building 
a history. A head prosecutor with five years of experience in the West North Central region 
such who recommended a suspended sentence and no monetary penalty stated, “I would . 
. . try to get a plea to the felony (at the expense of dismissing the misdemeanors), as that 
would enhance the criminal history score in the future were there to be another incident.”  
Other respondents who were considering possible future criminal offenses were 
willing to offer a plea to a lesser charge if the defendant could stay out of trouble for a 
period of time. One prosecutor in the Moutain region with 20 years of experience who 
recommended a suspended sentence and a year of probation commended, “I would charge 
the disorderly conduct, one count, for the disruption of the train station’s activity and for 
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frightening people, and offer him a misdemeanor resolution if he can stay out of trouble 
for 12 months.” 
Other respondents were oriented more toward the defendant’s past (lack of) criminal 
history when considering plea deals. A junior prosecutor from the West North Central 
region who would charge disorderly conduct and assault and recommended a suspended 
sentence and no fine wrote, “I’d probably dismiss one through plea negotiations due to the 
defendant’s lack of history.” 
Several respondents wanted to make plea decisions based on the victim’s input. An 
experienced prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended a $1,000 penalty 
wrote, “I would charge the felony but, if the victim consents, be willing to let the defendant 
plea to a misdemeanor.” Another prosecutor in the South Atlantic region with over 30 years 
of experience who recommended a $500 fine wrote, “I would also consult with the woman 
he grabbed . . . to get her input and explain both my charging decision and recommendation 
on a plea.” A Midwest prosecutor with over 25 years of experience who recommended no 
confinement and a suspended fine wrote, “This is merely a charging decision fitting the 
facts. I’d certainly be willing to bargain it down (depending on what the victim says). And 
an experienced head prosecutor in the Mountain region who recommended 10–20 days of 
confinement emphasized that the victim’s consent was necessary to offering a plea to lesser 
charges, remarking, “The knife is the most concerning part of this episode, so we start with 
the felonies, probably plead it to matching misdemeanors due to his criminal history IF 
victim agrees.” 
Some respondents who would charge a felony but later reduce the charge through plea 
negotiations focused on what type of charge they could prove. A midcareer prosecutor in 
the South Atlantic region who recommended a suspended sentence observed, “Of all the 
permissible charges, I found the most appropriate to be Disorderly Conduct, RCS 
101(A)(3). Although this is a felony with a 6-month minimum, the defendant’s conduct in 
brandishing is the most easily provable charge given the provable evidence. I felt there was 
insufficient evidence to prove Harassment, Endangerment, Criminal Nuisance, Aggravated 
Assault, and Loitering. In fact, I believe Assault would even be difficult to prove in light 
of the intent required, and I did not believe that there would be sufficient witnesses for 
Public Nuisance. Thus, I would charge the felony Disorderly Conduct and likely reduce it 
to the misdemeanor Disorderly Conduct with a suspended jail and monetary sentence.” 
Some respondents used plea bargaining as an incentive for the offender to obtain 
necessary social and behavioral services. A junior New England prosecutor who 
recommended a suspended sentence stated, “This is an individual who, under an emotional 
circumstance, made a bad decision that scared individuals around him. I would charge him 
with disorderly conduct, with the intent that he comply with treatment--either anger 
management or other therapy. Depending on his demeanor and level of remorse, I may also 
require him to complete some community service. If compliant, I would likely drop the 
case.” 
Others noted that flexibility in the plea negotiation process best served justice. Many 
respondents would bring multiple charges or charge a felony in order to get the offender to 
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plea to fewer or lesser charges in the process of negotiating a plea.146 One midcareer 
prosecutor in the South Atlantic region who recommended a fine between $250–$500 
observed, “By bringing three charges of varying degrees, we can ultimately make the plea 
recommendation/offer that best serves the interests of justice in a particular case. For 
instance, we can later dismiss the felony and proceed on the two misdemeanors if that’s 
what is appropriate. Or plea to the felony and merge in the misdemeanors if that’s 
appropriate.” A junior prosecutor in the Mountain region who recommended a suspended 
sentence and $500 fine stated, “When I screen for charges, I usually charge the maximum 
charges that I can and then in resolving the case a lot of it will depend and input from the 
victim and also how the defendant willingness to accept responsibility in regards to his 
actions and whether or not they have taken any steps before hand to address the issue.” 
And a New England head prosecutor with over 30 years of experience who recommended 
90 days in jail noted, “Despite being able to articulate a felony would work to get a 
misdemeanor plea as that represents the best balance of the public interest--a sanction 
which both punishes and has specific and general deterrence and a means of responding to 
further bad conduct (suspended sentences). No monetary fine. Not a fan of financial 
penalties--for those with means-largely meaningless--for those without means do not pay 
and ends up being largely meaningless.” 
Some respondents felt that prosecutors should bring more serious charges first to 
provide flexibility later, although they often noted that they did not think felony charges 
were warranted. An experienced prosecutor in the Pacific region who recommended a 
suspended sentence and no fine wrote, “In general, find the most serious charge for which 
there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. It is far easier to plea bargain down to reach 
a result consistent with justice than it is to seek higher charges down the road.” Similarly, 
a prosecutor with over 20 years of experience in the East South Central region who 
recommended a suspended sentence and a $500 fine per charge asserted, “A person should 
generally be charged with the most serious offense possible under the applicable laws and 
fact scenario. A part of being a good prosecutor, in my opinion, is having the wisdom and 
good judgment to know when to be harsh and when to be lenient. It is much easier to allow 
a plea to a lesser offense and more lenient sentence than the other way. Bottom line . . . 
you can always come down when warranted but you can’t go up.” An experienced 
prosecutor in the West North Central region who did not recommend any punishment 
wrote, “Filing felony gives room to negotiate down to misdemeanor.” A midcareer South 
Atlantic prosecutor who recommended two years of probation and a $1,000 fine wrote, “I 
would charge all if not several of the offenses in order to have charges to dismiss in the 
negotiation of the plea. I also tend to overcharge, because I can’t add charges later, but I 
can dismiss charges any time.”   
                                               
146 Several respondents specifically mentioned charging with the intent of dropping some 
charges or reducing the severity of the charges in negotiation with the defendant and the defense 
attorney. 29 respondents stated that they would charge a felony but allow the defendant to plead to 
a misdemeanor. Three respondents would select multiple charges but offer a plea to one felony 
charge in favor of dropping additional misdemeanor charges. Five respondents would charge 
multiple misdemeanors but allow the defendant to plead to a single misdemeanor charge. Ten 
respondents indicated that they would charge multiple counts at various levels in order to expand 
plea options. 
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Others thought that bringing multiple charges was a waste of time, however. One 
junior Midwest prosecutor who recommended a year in jail wrote, “I am charging the 
felonious assault and the lesser included misdemeanor assault. It is a waste of time to 
charge the nonassaultive charges because they would likely be dismissed anyway as part 
of a plea deal.” 
Still other respondents felt that more serious charges should only be brought if the 
defendant was uncooperative in the process of plea negotiations. An experienced Midwest 
prosecutor who recommended a suspended sentence and suspended fine wrote, “I would 
charge the minimum charge necessary to get the goal desired, that being probation (or 
suspended sentence). If the defendant would not accept that plea and sentence, then I would 
most likely dismiss the case and reissue it with all the charges that apply, including the 
felony for recklessly displaying the knife.”  A midcareer prosecutor in the Midwest region 
who recommended a suspended sentence and probation wrote, “I would charge him with 
disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor level. In making that decision, although noting that his 
conduct could properly fit a felony disorderly conduct (while armed with a dangerous 
weapon), I also take into consideration his lack of prior record, his cooperation and de-
escalation of the situation when law enforcement arrived, and his motivation for conducting 
himself in this manner. . . . I would be seeking probation (a suspended sentence) to 
determine if any mental health or substance abuse issues existed. . . . Should this defendant 
choose to take this case to trial, however, I would likely re-file the case with at least one 
felony count, as it would indicate to me that he has no interest in taking accountability for 
his actions and is not likely to self-correct in the future.” A junior Midwest prosecutor who 
recommended a suspended sentence wrote, “Only charging Assault and Battery would be 
my initial charge, but if defendant was not willing to plea on that count and insisted on a 
trial, there would likely be more charges at trial - any charges supported by the evidence 
necessarily presented regarding the Assault and Battery.” 
Overall, many prosecutors reported filing charges against defendant without the desire 
to have defendant serve that time, but to use charges as a negotiation tool or to build a 
criminal history. 
 
C.  General Decision-Making Process 
 
After the respondents answered questions about the vignette, we then asked 
respondents about how prosecutors in their office make charging decisions. We asked who 
makes the charging decision, whether the crime is a felony or misdemeanor changes the 
decision-making process, who prosecutes the case after decisions are made about charging, 
and whether their office has internal guidelines or standards governing charging decisions. 
We present their responses to these survey questions as well as qualitative analysis of any 
additional comments they provided below. Notably, the vast majority of prosecutors (72%) 
made charging and plea bargaining decisions alone, and the majority (57%) even 
prosecuted the cases without any input from another prosecutor. 
 
1.  Responsibility for Charging/Plea Bargaining Decisions and Prosecution 
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We were interested in knowing about prosecutors’ charging and plea-bargaining 
process. We asked respondents about how “the decision as to charging and plea bargaining 
[would] be made in [their] office.” The vast majority, 72.46% of respondents (392), 
indicated that a front-line prosecutor would make the decision alone. 12.01% of 
respondents (65) indicated that a front-line prosecutor would make the decision after 
consulting with a superior. 1.29% of respondents (7) indicated that a front-line prosecutor 
would advise a superior and he or she would make the decision. One respondent (.18% of 
respondents) indicated that a committee or board of prosecutors would make a collective 
decision without the front-line prosecutor involved. Two respondents (.37% of 
respondents) indicated that a committee or board of prosecutors would make a collective 
decision with the front-line prosecutor involved. 13.68% (74) selected other, of which 15 
respondents indicated that the police make the initial charging decision in their jurisdiction 
and six respondents were the only prosecutor in their office. 
We next asked respondents whether “the screening process change[s] if the crime is a 
felony rather than a misdemeanor?” 29.63% of respondents (160) said yes, and 70.37% of 
respondents (380) said no. 
Finally, we asked respondents “After the initial charging decision is made, what 
happens to the case?” 27.22% of respondents (147) indicated that the case is assigned to 
another attorney who has discretion to change the charges. 1.67% of respondents (9) 
indicated that the case is assigned to another attorney who does not have discretion to 
change the charges. 57.22% of respondents (309) indicated that the attorney who makes 
the charging decision prosecutes the case. 13.89% of respondents (75) selected other. Of 
the respondents who selected other, 33 explained that the case is reassigned to a prosecutor 
who has at least partial discretion over the charges. 
In sum, our study revealed that prosecutors typically acted alone in charging and 
prosecuting the cases that came before them. 
 
2.  Internal Guidelines or Standards 
 
Slightly over half of prosecutors we surveyed had internal guidelines they were able 
to follow in making charging decisions. Specifically we asked respondents whether their 
“office [has] internal guidelines or standards that dictate how prosecutors make charging 
decisions?” 8.74% of respondents (47) indicated that their office has mandatory internal 
guidelines or standards that prosecutors must follow when making charging decisions. 
45.35% of respondents (244) indicated that their office has internal guidelines or standards 
that prosecutors should consider when making charging decisions, but following them is 
not necessary. 45.91% of respondents (247) indicated that their office does not have 
internal guidelines or standards and each prosecutor decides based on their best judgment. 
Overall, most prosecutors had some guidelines, (though 45.9% had no guidelines at all) 
and those who did, only a small number (8.7%) indicated that they were mandatory. 
We then asked respondents, “If your office has internal guidelines or standards, what 
do they state in regards to charging?” 30 respondents referenced ABA standards (either 
explicitly or by listing the standards), 20 referenced NDAA standards (either explicitly or 
by listing the standards), 44 referenced “reasonable likelihood of success at trial/reasonable 
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likelihood of conviction,” 49 referenced “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and 18 mentioned 
“probable cause.” 
Some respondents conveyed that they had office policies, but declined to provide 
them. For some who declined to provide their office guidelines, the reason was that it was 
impracticable to do so because of length. One representative comment from a head 
prosecutor with three years of experience in the Pacific region was, “Too long to 
summarize here.”Others offered only generalities about their office policies because they 
were proprietary. One experienced Midwest prosecutor stated, “Proprietary. Generally, we 
make these decisions considering the history, mental health, prior criminal justice contacts, 
wishes of the victims (if any), whether there was use of the dangerous weapon, any 
injuries.” 
In sum, though internal guidance exists for prosecutors it was rarely mandatory, nor 
did the majority of offices provide specific guidance on severity or uniformity of charging. 
The remainder of this Part, subsections a, b, and c, will describe common themes from 
responses about what guidelines and standards govern prosecutor decision making. 
 
(a)  Guidelines and Discretion 
 
Several respondents mentioned that their guidelines varied by type of crime. One 
midcareer prosecutor in the South Atlantic region noted that their office has “a grid that 
determines charging and punishment.” A head prosecutor with one year of experience in 
the Mountain region wrote, “Our standards are specific to types of crimes. For example, 
domestic violence, sexual assault and child endangerment are always charged as initially 
reported by the victim or witness. Nonviolent felonies may be considered for deferral prior 
to charging. The charging decision on most misdemeanors and infractions are left to the 
discretion of the law enforcement officer who handled the report or investigation.” An 
experienced Midwest prosecutor stated, “We only have policies/guidelines related to 
certain types of cases when certain facts are present that dictate how we should charge. 
Otherwise, charging is up to each individual prosecutor based on each individual case and 
facts.” Other respondents gave very detailed descriptions of their standards and how they 
varied by crimes. 
Others noted that while they did have guidelines for some types of crimes, they did 
not have guidelines for every type of crime. For example, a midcareer prosecutor in the 
Pacific region conveyed, “We do not have policies for every single crime, and I believe it 
would be impossible to establish rigid guidelines for all charging decisions given all of the 
factors involved in a criminal case. But we do have guidelines regarding certain types of 
cases. For example, certain types of felony drug possession cases are generally charged as 
misdemeanors if an individual has a clean record.” A junior prosecutor in the Mountain 
region stated, “There are few such guidelines. They mostly are tied to specific types of 
cases i.e. domestic violence or DUI. However, we have an open door policy and you must 
be able to defend your decisions and are expected to get feedback when in doubt.” An 
experienced Midwest prosecutor wrote, “Standards are in place for particular crimes such 
as assaults, drunk driving and sexual offenses involving children. Otherwise the charging 
attorney has discretion to decide as to the appropriate charge and possible plea resolution.” 
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Others noted that while they have guidelines, prosecutors have discretion to vary from 
them. A head prosecutor with 30 years of experience in the Mountain region commented, 
“We have a charging manual, but most of our prosecutors are aware of how we do things 
and the younger prosecutors are trained by the more experienced prosecutors and often go 
to the more experienced attorneys for advice. We give our prosecutors a lot of discretion.” 
An experienced Midwest prosecutor wrote, “They are charge specific and just guidelines.” 
A head New England prosecutor with over 30 years of experience stated, “There is a 
prosecutor desk book that essentially affords prosecutors discretion in charging that varies 
with the offense, history of the defendant, victim's input, cooperation and willingness of 
the defendant to cooperate with programs and services offered. We try to distinguish 
between those who are dangerous and/or have victimized others and are likely to do so 
again and those who need services and direction.” A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic 
region characterized their office guidelines as “more of a tool and benchmark to go off of 
on the average case.” 
Others noted that their only guideline was to follow relevant state statutes, and beyond 
this, they had discretion in charging decisions. An experienced Midwest prosecutor 
commented, “It is discretionary for the charging prosecutor unless mandated by statute.” 
Similarly, a Midwest prosecutor with over 25 years of experience stated, “We are to 
comply with statutory victim rights.” A head prosecutor with 25 years of experience in the 
South Atlantic region stated, “There are certain offenses for which a minimum sentence is 
statutorily mandated. The prosecutor must, of course, follow the law, but can work around 
mandatory minimums by agreeing to reduce the charges.” And one experienced Midwest 
prosecutor stated that their “standards mimic those in the State ethics guidelines for 
prosecutors.” 
In sum, prosecutors noted that guidelines were distinct for separate crimes and that 
they could depart from them, as long as they followed state statutes.  
 
(b)  Standards and Discretion 
 
Some respondents described their general office policy for making charging decisions. 
One junior prosecutor in the Mountain region stated, “Screen conservatively, prosecute 
aggressively. Consult with victims prior to charging. Run potentially controversial cases 
by a superior.” Another Mountain region prosecutor with almost 30 years of experience 
wrote, “We have guidelines that are a loose set of charging objectives in place to make ad 
hoc decisions. / We must consider a person's criminal history. / Is he a frequent flyer or is 
this his first entry into the criminal justice system. / Is he a 1%er, someone from whom 
society needs protection, or a knucklehead exercising poor judgment, bad decision making, 
or drug/alcohol induced poor decision making. / Sometimes a crime may be a felony but 
we can achieve all out objectives by charging and prosecuting a misdemeanor. / These are 
illustrative not exhaustive.” 
Many noted that their standards were not in writing. One midcareer prosecutor in the 
South Atlantic region noted, “The guidelines and standards are not written and are 
otherwise informal. [B]asically we are to charge what is appropriate and not overcharge. 
We are to keep in mind that any plea negotiations begin, meaning the maximum, is what 
is charged and goes down from there.” A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region 
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mentioned that the lack of a formal, written standard did not result in inconsistency because 
of strong informal standards. They wrote, “We do not have any formal standards but do 
often consult with other prosecutors and the District Attorney in sensitive, unique, or high 
profile cases. Due to this, although we don't have any kind of sentencing grid, broadly 
speaking, charging decisions are consistent from ADA to ADA.” 
Several respondents offered standards that were directions to charge based on the 
crime committed or the strength of the evidence. One prosecutor with over 30 years of 
experience in the Pacific region stated their office policy was to “Charge the most serious 
charges legally supported by the evidence.” Similarly, one Midwest prosecutor with over 
30 years of experience stated, “Nothing specified. The prosecutors are told to charge the 
offenses they think are appropriate, given the facts of the case.” A head prosecutor with 10 
years of experience in the Mountain region wrote, “We charge the crimes committed.” A 
junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region commented, “[M]ake charging decisions 
based off of warrants unless frivolous charges appear that cannot be proven.” An 
experienced South Atlantic prosecutor stated, “generally, all charges supported by the facts 
should be charged, however, there is more discretion in serious cases where the question 
is about lesser-included counts.” A head prosecutor with 10 years of experience in the 
Mountain region wrote, “Charge conservatively, taking into account any obvious defenses 
and suppression issues.” 
Some respondents reported guidance to avoid felony charges when possible, however. 
One Midwest head prosecutor with over 20 years of experience stated, “We try to avoid 
felony charges if possible based upon youth, lack of prior record, etc. We also choose 
misdemeanors over felonies when the circumstances of the crime simply do not arise to 
level of what are classified as "serious" crimes (felony).” 
Some respondents connected their charging guidance to the plea process. Several 
respondents had office policies against overcharging. An experienced prosecutor in the 
Mountain region stated, “We do not charge counts just to use them for plea negotiations. 
we charge based on the facts.” A midcareer Mountain prosecutor noted that, “Charging 
should be done based off of the criminal statutes and charges should not be stacked for the 
purposes of pleas or early disposition.” An experienced Midwest prosecutor stated, “Never 
overcharge a defendant with the idea of plea bargaining later. Consult victim and police in 
making a charging decision. Charge defendant fairly.” Another midcareer Midwest 
prosecutor commented, “In general, our office has a policy that if a felony is charged, then 
the prosecutor must seek a felony conviction. There are exceptions, of course, but in 
general the idea is that we do not want to charge high just to get misdemeanor convictions 
and bully our way into convictions.” 
Not all standards were against overcharging, however. Some respondents noted the 
need for flexibility in the plea-bargaining process. One junior prosecutor in the South 
Atlantic region wrote, “My office’s policy is to take a good look at the evidence, evaluate 
its strengths and weaknesses, then to reach out to witnesses to seek any clarifications 
necessary. Once that is done, only the most pertinent charges are brought. For instance, if 
a Defendant is charged with a serious felony offense and multiple misdemeanors, our 
policy is to evaluate whether those additional misdemeanors need to be charged in light of 
the substantial penalty a Defendant may face due to the felony. However, sometimes 
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misdemeanor offenses will also be charged to leave room for compromise resolutions, 
whether that be after trial or during the plea negotiation stage.” 
Several respondents indicated that their office standards were based on fairness and 
equality considerations. An experienced Midwest prosecutor noted that in their office “we 
try to treat all cases equally,” and a midcareer Mountain prosecutor stated a similar 
principle: “There are ethical considerations-- ensure that Defendants are treated equally if 
they are similarly situated. No hard and fast rules, but common sense.” A midcareer 
prosecutor in the Mountain region stated, “That we should be consistent in our approach to 
types of cases, so as to discourage prosecutor-shopping.” Another midcareer Mountain 
prosecutor wrote, “The general standard is to prosecute from the end result we are seeking. 
In other words, we look at a case and determine what a fair outcome would be for all the 
parties involved and then we make a decision of what charges to file.” An experienced 
prosecutor in the West North Central region wrote that, “Generally, case must be supported 
by evidence and not based on gender or race etc.” A prosecutor with 20 years of experience 
in the Middle Atlantic region stated their office policy was, “Do not overcharge. Do not 
consider race, sex, national origin, "political" connections, etc. Decision should be fact-
driven only.” 
Others indicated that their standards were based on public safety and criminal history 
considerations. A head prosecutor with seven years of experience in the West North Central 
region  commented, “Public safety is the highest priority. Consideration should be given to 
the level of threat to public safety, followed by criminal history.” An experienced Midwest 
prosecutor noted, “We should charge the repeater if the defendant qualifies, add the 
enhancers if they are available, etc.” A junior prosecutor in the South Atlantic region stated, 
“It greatly depends on the person criminal history. If the person is a convicted felon, our 
office will as for some confinement time depending on the charges and the facts. If the 
person does not have criminal history we can justify a lesser sentence or reduction in 
criminal charges.” 
Others who did not list standards or guidelines in the above categories summarized a 
succinct, overarching standard or philosophy their office used. These were varied. One 
midcareer prosecutor in the Mountain region offered the following standard: “Do the right 
thing. Do the smart thing. Remember who you are fighting for.” A head prosecutor with 
over 40 years of experience in the South Atlantic region said their standard was, “Just do 
the right thing. Everything else will take care of itself.” A Midwest prosecutor with almost 
30 years of experience said, “Use best judgment and do what is best for all. As a 
misdemeanor, it would be a quick decision, and rarely subject to review.” A New England 
head prosecutor with over 30 years of experience wrote, “Use discretion, don’t embarrass 
the office.” 
Other respondents provided a list of standards that do not fit neatly into the above 
described categories. One head prosecutor with three years of experience in the Mountain 
region wrote the following: “-defendants are citizens / -overcriminalization is a problem / 
-criminal justice overlap with juvenile justice deserves special concern so the state's aims 
do not conflict / -marijuana possession (no kids, not in school zones, not for delivery) is 
NOT a major concern / -protect the public -- especially crimes of violence / -prosecute 
elder abuse.” 
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Prosecutors listed various different standards like conservatively screening cases, 
consulting with victims, and running controversial cases by superiors, and some also noted 
that standards were not in writing. Many prosecutors focused on public safety and criminal 
history considerations, along with fairness and equality. Others were focused on flexibility 
in charging and some noted overcharging as a problem. 
 
(c)  Supervision and Discretion 
 
Several respondents reported needing to consult with a supervisor, and one junior 
prosecutor in the South Atlantic region reported that “If a newer ADA, charging decisions 
would be verified/approved by the intake supervising ADA.” A midcareer Mountain 
prosecutor reported, “Any case that is or has the potential to be in the news must be cleared 
with administration first.” 
One elected West North Central prosecutor with over 30 years of experience wrote 
that their judgment was the office’s standard. “Our office is relatively small, with six 
prosecutors. As the elected District Attorney, I closely monitor charging decisions and let 
my Assistants know if I disapprove of them. I guess you might say I am the internal 
guideline and standard. I give my Assistants broad discretion and try not to micro-manage 
them. But I do let them know if I want a certain situation handled in a particular manner, 
and if they undercharged or overcharged a criminal situation.” 
 
3.  Information Important for Decision Making 
 
We also asked prosecutors about what information is necessary for them to make 
charging decisions. We asked “Which of the following pieces of information do you need 
in order to make a charging decision?” and provided respondents 28 pieces of information. 
See Figure 7 to see what pieces of information were important to respondents. The most 
commonly selected answers (at least 75% of respondents selected) included: severity of 
personal injuries, use of weapons, severity of property damage, suspect’s behavior, number 
of victims, presence of weapons, suspect’s prior convictions, age of victims, presence of 
illegal drugs, and use of illegal drugs.147 
                                               
147 One in 20 (4.43%) of respondents (24) said that they needed to know the suspect’s race 
prior to making a charging decision. When respondents selected this, we asked them to “Please 
explain why you consider the suspect’s race when making a charging decision.” There were three 
reasons respondents listed for needing the suspect’s race 
First, prosecutors (13) indicated that they needed this information to determine whether there 
was a potential hate crime. One junior Midwest prosecutor wrote, “If the suspect’s race is different 
from the victim’s I would evaluate whether there was any element of it being some type of hate 
crime.” A head prosecutor with over 20 years of experience in the West North Central region noted 
“Because depending on the crime committed, the motive of the crime and/or the race, gender, 
sexuality, religious affiliation, ethnicity of the victim, the offender can be charged with committing 
a Hate Crime under [state] Law. If there is no evidence of a hate crime then the suspect’s race is 
completely immaterial and never considered in any way shape or form.” 
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We also provided space for respondents to write up to four additional pieces of 
information relevant to their decision making. The most common piece of information 
needed was input or information from the victim (36 respondents) followed by input or 
information from witnesses (30).148 Other respondents (19) reported that the information 
they need is case specific. Fifteen respondents reported that they needed facts of the case, 
and 14 need more information about the evidence (e.g., strength, quality). Twelve 
respondents wrote that they need information about the suspect’s mental health and 
psychiatric history, 11 need demographic information to determine whether there is a hate 
crime or domestic violence, 11 need information on the relationship between the suspect 
and victim, 10 need any known substance use/drug testing results, and nine need the 
suspect’s criminal history and domestic violence history. Eight report needing the suspect’s 
personal information (e.g., job, address, socioeconomic status, veteran status, etc.).149  
                                               
Second, prosecutors (12) indicated that this information is standard biographical and 
identifying information. As one experienced prosecutor in the Pacific region noted, “We’re required 
to input demographic information for identity purposes. That is the only reason.” An experienced 
prosecutor in the South Atlantic region commented that “we don’t consider it in making charging 
decisions, but we do mandate that the screening attorney note it in our case management system.” 
Other respondents noted that knowing the suspect’s race served multiple purposes. A Midwest 
prosecutor with 25 years of experience wrote that “It’s a required field for reporting purposes; 
otherwise, it’s of no consequence in most cases; the sole exception would be for a charge of ethnic 
intimidation (where the race of both the suspect and the victim would be noted).” An experienced 
prosecutor in the Pacific region commented that “We must consider everything. Race can be relevant 
in certain cases—identification and racially motivated crimes are obvious examples.” 
Third, prosecutors (2) reported needing to know the suspect’s race because of the potential for 
police misconduct. One midcareer prosecutor in the South Atlantic region noted, “There are racial 
inequities and I have dismissed cases because the only “suspicious behavior'” has been the race of 
the person (i.e. a Hispanic male walking across a park. he is stopped and searched. He has marijuana 
on him) I dismiss cases where the reason for the investigation is racially motivated. Also, law 
enforcement is more likely to arrest a child of color than a white child. I am cognizant of these 
aspects when evaluating the response of the adults as well as the children.”  
148 A total of 96 respondents indicated that they would consider the victim’s input, which 
includes the 36 who supplied this information as part of this question. And another 60 respondents 
noted victim’s input when explaining their decision making for the case vignette or how their office 
makes decisions. 
149 Seven report needing audio or video recordings of the incident, 911 call audio, or news 
media reports. Seven report needing to know the defendant’s statement, intent, or justification. Six 
need to know about the victim or witness reliability and criminal history. Six need information on 
the search and seizure, Miranda issues, police behavior, and investigation efforts. Three report 
needing information about mitigating/aggravating factors. Three report needing information about 
pending/current charges and whether the defendant is on probation. Three need medical records and 
reports, and three need information about the cost of damage/theft. Two need probable cause 
information, two need confidential informant status, and two need a risk assessment (i.e., risk to the 
community). Each of the following pieces of information was listed by one respondent: name 
of/information about suspect’s girlfriend, suspect’s status in the sex offender registry, “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” whether minors were present, whether there is corroboration, whether the 
defendant is cooperating with law enforcement, whether there are accomplices/suspect’s degree of 
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In sum, the most important information the vast majority (75%) of respondents wanted 
included the severity of injury/damage/weapons used, suspect’s behavior, number and age 




IV.  DISCUSSION 
 
This section considers our results in light of questions of interest about prosecutorial 
discretion and its effects—variability and severity of charging, the relevance of internal 
and national guidance on prosecutorial discretion, and factors considered by prosecutors in 
making a decision.  
                                               
participation in the crime, whether there is insurance coverage, and “reasonable likelihood of 
success at trial.” 
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A.  Severity and Variability 
 
To understand disparities in criminal justice outcomes, it is key to understand whether 
and how prosecutors’ decisions are driving those outcomes. This study’s vignette design 
solves one of the key problems with observational research—omitted variable bias. In 
particular, this study held constant every aspect of the criminal behavior and police 
conduct, including geographic differences and differences in conduct and background. 
Prosecutorial discretion exists for a reason: each case is distinctive, and requires 
individualized attention. Yet, prior social science work may fail to detect subtle variations 
in case factors, which the study’s method holds constant. By holding all those other factors 
constant, we can observe prosecutorial discretion itself.  
We found remarkable severity in penalties imposed by some prosecutors. Recall that 
$500 was the most common fine imposed for this situation, where no victim was injured 
and no property was damaged. Broad surveys of the U.S. population show that six out of 
ten Americans do not have $500 in savings, which suggests that this fine amount may be 
onerous.150  It would certainly be an amount an average fast food worker (the occupation 
of the hypothetical defendant in some of our vignettes) would be unlikely to pay, leading 
to other serious criminal justice implications for an arguably minor offense. These serious 
criminal charges can have devastating effects on an individual’s life. 
Even more, recall that almost 30% of prosecutors recommended jail time for an 
individual with no criminal record and who seems to need short-term therapy or a cooling-
down period. The modal response was 30 days in jail, which would likely result in this 
individual losing his job, and likely stable housing and family life (a very small number of 
prosecutors did note a willingness to allow confinement to be on weekends, however). This 
is a compelling finding that a sample of prosecutors would recommend such a long jail 
term for an individual who has certainly made a mistake, but has not caused any physical 
harm or property damage, and does not have the risk factors of being dangerous. Even aside 
from the effects on defendants and their families, such incarceration also imposes onerous 
financial costs on the government—amounting to $45,000 per year in some jurisdictions.151 
                                               
150 Robertson et al., supra note 117. 
151 See, e.g., Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,891, 
63,891–92 (Nov. 19, 2019) (“Based on [Fiscal Year] 2018 data, [Fiscal Year] 2018 [Cost of 
Incarceration Fee] was $37,449.00 ($102.60 per day) for Federal inmates in Bureau facilities.”); 
Legislative Analyst's Office, How much does it cost to incarcerate an inmate?: California’s Annual 
Costs to Incarcerate an Inmate in Prison, CAL. LEGIS.’S NONPARTISAN FISCAL AND POL’Y ADVISOR, 
https://lao.ca.gov/PolicyAreas/CJ/6_cj_inmatecost (Jan. 2019) (“It costs an average of about 
$81,000 per year to incarcerate an inmate in prison in California.”); Nicole Lewis & Beatrix 
Lockwood, The Hidden Cost of Incarceration, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 17, 2019), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/12/17/the-hidden-cost-of-
incarceration#:~:text=The%20Bureau%20of%20Justice%20Statistics,2.3%20million%20people%
20behind%20bars (“The Bureau of Justice Statistics reckons that the United States spends more 
than $80 billion each year to keep roughly 2.3 million people behind bars.”). 
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Some of this severity may be due to plea bargaining strategies. Recall that many 
respondents were unwilling to impose punishment given the lack of harm to people or 
property and in light of the offender’s perceived mental health issues. But several 
respondents noted in their qualitative comments that they would bring multiple charges or 
more severe charges in order to induce the defendant to plea guilty to fewer or less severe 
charges or to accept mental health or substance abuse treatment.152 Some respondents 
reported opposition to overcharging, however, and reported only bringing charges they felt 
they could prove.  Future research should systematically study variation in prosecutors’ 
views on plea bargaining strategies. 
Aside from the severity of sentences, the variability is also striking. The Supreme 
Court has reiterated that the Constitution “requires that all persons subjected to . . . 
legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the 
privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.”153 Prosecutors nationally charged 
similarly situated defendants who allegedly committed the same crime to varying terms of 
two years of prison time, six months of jail time, down to thirty days of jail time or 
community service. Similarly, some prosecutors charged defendants hefty fines of up to 
$5,000 dollars and others $500 or much lesser amounts of $250. All of this demonstrates 
that prosecutorial discretion is indeed broad, largely unsupervised, and highly variable and 
inconsistent. This is an important finding for those studying prosecutors to consider as far 
as potential interventions.  
Most of this variation was inexplicable. We did however observe some correlations 
that merit further study. Prosecutors in some regions of the country appear to be harsher 
than others—specifically prosecutors in the West South Central and the Mountain regions. 
Further exploration into the causes of variability are required.  
 
B.  Guidelines and Standards 
 
This wide variability in prosecutor decisions is consistent with a lack of meaningful 
supervision or guidance within prosecutor charging. Prosecutors’ offices have been called 
“black boxes” for the lack of transparency about how charging decisions are made, but our 
study sheds light.154 Our data show the general unimportance of supervisors and office 
guidelines to prosecutors making charging decisions. In our survey, nearly three-quarters 
of prosecutors reported that they decided alone; their supervisors provided no direction into 
the initial charging decisions. Although somewhat more than half of respondents said they 
typically relied on mandatory or precatory guidelines, nearly half indicated that they had 
no such direction. For those respondents who did have direction, their guidelines often 
afforded them significant discretion to deviate or were only an internal office standard such 
as “do justice.” And although some prosecutors reported having charging manuals or grids, 
many prosecutors reported that guidelines or standards were not in writing. And some 
                                               
152 The outcome for prosecutors who overcharge may thus be similar to the outcome of 
prosecutors who initially recommend no punishment. 
153  Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 72–73 (1887). 
154 See, e.g., Miller & Wright, supra note 6. 
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noted that their guidelines and standards were “proprietary,” which raises questions about 
transparency. These findings suggest avenues for reform, both within prosecutors’ offices 
and beyond. 
A first step may be to simply require prosecutors to note their reasons for making 
discretionary decisions.155 Richard Frase argued that this approach can be successful as 
“reasons evolve into factors, and factors evolve into rules.”156 Frase goes on to explain that 
“the use of written reasons for prosecution decisions, which are routinely reviewed by 
supervising attorneys, seems the minimum requirement for effective control of prosecution 
decisions.”157 Judge Stephanos Bibas has also claimed that “[s]imply having to explain and 
justify one’s decisions disciplines prosecutors, much as writing reasoned decisions 
disciplines judges.”158 Prosecutors offices might consider requiring prosecutors to 
articulate the reasons for the charges they impose, with internal quarterly or bi-annual 
review of decisions to determine whether they match the objectives of the office. 
Overall, our data demonstrate—as theorized—that individual prosecutors have the 
utmost discretion to charge defendants as they see fit. We see stark severity in sanctioning 
some defendants, but this study also demonstrates that for the same crime, defendants 
receive largely varying and harsh or lenient sentences, depending on the prosecutor they 
interact with. Structural changes must be made if more consistency and decreased severity 
are desired in prosecutorial charging.159 
 
C.  Factors Relevant to Decision Making 
 
Our study also highlights factors relevant to prosecutor decision making. When 
presented with a list of factors important to make a charging decision, respondents 
unsurprisingly reported needing to know about the harm to persons and property, the 
number and age of victims, the criminal history of the offender, and the presence and use 
of weapons. Several also reported needing the victim’s input and information from 
witnesses, a finding that was also present in their responses to the vignette. Knowing 
whether the offender had mental health or substance abuse issues was also important to 
many prosecutors, although this was clearer in their responses to the vignette than in 
response to the survey question. It was unclear whether knowing about drug use was 
important in charging for purposes of greater leninency, more severe charges, or for 
diversionary purposes. Finally, while very few reported needing to know about the 
offender’s education or job to make a charging decision, the qualitative responses to the 
vignette demonstrate that many prosecutors do consider the socioeconomic status of the 
                                               
155 Frase, supra note 128, at 292–96. 
156  Id. at 294. 
157 Id. at 294. 
158 Bibas, supra note 14, at 1006. 
159 See Barkow, supra note 4 (manuscript at 21) (“We need structural changes to do more than 
chip away at the edge of mass incarceration.”); see also Baughman, supra note 13, at 1139 (“Rather 
than trying to address the individual failing branches, . . . instituting subconstitutional checks-
stopgaps adopted by the three branches of government to effectuate the rights in the Constitution 
when the system is stalled in dysfunction could create meaningful change.”). 
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offender when deciding whether a fine or a term of confinement is important. It is important 
to acknowledge that while prosecutors claim that these factors are the most important, it is 
unclear that that is the case. Prosecutors could be making subconsious decisions based on 
factors in our vignette that they are unaware influenced them.160 However, having a list of 
factors important to the majority of prosecutors provides an important insight into the black 
box of prosecutor discretion. We hope it will spark future research on the factors considered 
by prosecutors in charging decisions. 
 
D.  Limitations 
 
As with any empirical study, our study has several limitations. First, while our study 
is national in scope, it is not representative. That is, we recruited respondents from every 
region in the United States, but the sample does not represent prosecutors in the U.S. For 
example, we have an overrepresentation of prosecutors in the Mountain region in our study 
(likely because two of the three authors were professors at universities in the Mountain 
region at the time the study was conducted). We also had a relatively low response rate of 
12%, and there may be significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents in 
how they make decisions and use discretion. Moreover, respondents were not required to 
answer all of the survey questions or write in responses when prompted. Thus, there may 
be differences within the sample between respondents who offered additional information 
and respondents who did not. 
Additionally, we designed the study to be short, including just a few questions. The 
primary objective of the study was to test the effects of race and class on prosecutor 
decision making in a vignette-based experiment,161 and a few survey questions were added 
to obtain more information about prosecutor decision making generally. The responses to 
the open-ended questions offered an opportunity to acquire further insight into prosecutor 
decision making, but cannot provide the rich data that a semi-structured interview with 
prosecutors would. With respect to the qualitative analysis, however, our sample size is 
very large, and so while there is not the depth of typical qualitative studies, there is 
significant breadth. We were thus able to quantify some of the qualitative data. 
It is likely, however, that our study underestimates the importance of some of the 
themes we identified in the qualitative analysis. For example, we only asked respondents 
to recommend a monetary penalty or term of confinement and did not ask them about 
whether they would recommend mental health treatment. While many respondents brought 
up mental health concerns, it is likely that more prosecutors would recommend treatment 
if we had explicitly asked them to reflect on this. 
Furthermore, we only provided one hypothetical crime to prosecutors, and it was 
relatively minor. Prosecutors see a wide range of criminal activity, including severe 
criminal activity, and so the results about the vignette may not be applicable to other types 
of crime. Future research may want to present prosecutors with multiple different crimes. 
                                               
160 See, e.g., LEONARD MLODINOW, SUBLIMINAL: HOW YOUR UNCONSCIOUS MIND RULES 
YOUR BEHAVIOR (2012). 
161 Robertson et al., supra note 117. 
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In brief, our study should be understood as exploratory. The results presented in this 
Article can give rise to hypotheses to be tested in future quantitative studies or to develop 




Much remains unknown about how prosecutors make decisions. Our national study 
was designed to illuminate the role of discretion in prosecutor decision making as well as 
the effects of such discretion. Our study best tracks what prosecutors wish they could 
charge defendants with when resource constraints are removed, which provides insight into 
the mind of prosecutors practicing in various jurisdictions across the country. As seen from 
the responses to the vignette we provided, different prosecutors evaluating the same case 
recommend vastly different charges and punitive sanctions. Additionally, we described a 
relatively minor crime, but a subset of respondents recommended harsh sanctions. This 
may be due, in part, to the absence of internal or national guidelines prosecutors report 
needing to follow. The findings from our exploratory study provide a starting point for 
future research assessing the variability and severity of prosecutors’ decisions, as well as 
the role of standards and guidelines in constraining discretion. 
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APPENDIX:  VIGNETTES, OMITTED RACE AND OCCUPATION 
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